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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) technologies have made our lives more convenient and
better informed by sensing and monitoring our surroundings. Security applications,
such as device pairing and user authentication, are the fundamentals for building a
trustworthy smart environment. A secure and convenient pairing approach is critical
to IoT enabled applications, as pairing is to establish a secure wireless communication
channel for devices. Besides, a smart environment usually has multiple people (e.g.,
patients and doctors in a hospital), who have physical access to the deployed IoT
devices and sensitive dumb objects (e.g., a cabinet storing medical records); but
not all of them are supposed to operate the devices/objects and access potentially
sensitive information stored in them. Therefore, how to authenticate users operating
on the IoT devices and dumb objects is highly important.
Existing security measures either rely on special hardware, have bad usability, or
are vulnerable to attacks, and thus fail to protect resource-constrained IoT devices
and dumb objects. This thesis aims at addressing the above shortcomings and im-
plementing three security applications: (1) performing secure pairing for IoT devices
that lack conventional user interfaces, such as keyboards and display; (2) providing
secure and applicable authentication for IoT devices; (3) validating uses of sensitive
dumb objects that have no user input interfaces.
First, we propose a technique, Universal Operation Sensing, which allows an IoT
device to sense the user’s physical operations on it without requiring inertial sensors.
Based on this technique, a user carrying a smartphone or wearing a wristband can
finish pairing in seconds by ‘touching’, in the form of some very simple operations,
v
the target device. We design a pairing protocol based on fuzzy commitment, and
build a prototype system named T2Pair. The comprehensive evaluation shows that
it is secure and usable.
Second, we design three usable authentication gestures by asking the user to ‘pet’
(in the form of some very simple touches for about 2 seconds) on the devices. We
build a secure and intuitive authentication method that authenticates device users by
comparing the petting operations sensed by devices and those captured by the user
wristband. The authentication method is highly secure as physical operations are
required, rather than based on proximity. It is also intuitive, adopting very simple
authentication operations, e.g., clicking buttons, twisting rotary knobs, and swiping
touchscreens. Unlike the state-of-the-art methods, our method does not require any
hardware modifications of devices, and thus can be applied to commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) devices.
Finally, We present the first implicit and accurate authentication approach for
dumb objects, named MoMatch. (1) It provides implicit and continuous authentication
for dumb objects, which do not have traditional authentication interfaces like keypads
and mice. (2) It is accurate with average area under the curve (AUC) across 10
different dumb objects = 0.97. (3) It makes fast authentication decision based on a
single object interaction, e.g., pushing a door. (4) It uses zero biometrics, so does
not need user profiling. (5) Rigorous security studies are performed, showing that
MoMatch is resilient to attacks. The approach is built on a solid causal relationship:
an object has a motion typically because a human hand moves it; thus, the object’s
motion and the legitimate user’s hand movement should correlate.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As the cost of Internet of Things (IoT) enabling technologies keeps decreasing,
a wide range of devices have become smart and broadly deployed. The number of
installed IoT devices is estimated to reach 75 billion by 2025 [126], and a typical family
home could contain 500 smart objects by 2022 [32]. A smart environment, relying
on various IoT devices, tends to make a place more convenient and comfortable. For
instance, smart locks and garage door openers allow users to grant or deny access to
visitors. Smart refrigerators are able to keep track of expiration dates, make shopping
lists and reorder food before they run out [6, 104].
While smart devices have brought great convenience to users, their pervasive pres-
ence and connectivity also create new opportunities for security breaches. First, IoT
enabled applications usually require wireless communication for exchanging informa-
tion and actuating functions, but the communication channel mostly established on
manufacturers’ default secrets is susceptible to vulnerabilities. One recent example is
the Mirai botnet in 2016 [37]. A large number of networked smart devices, such as IP
cameras, home appliances, etc., which use default preloaded passwords, were infected
by Mirai and turned into bots for executing controlled DDoS attacks. Although this
issue can be mitigated by using a unique key for each device, high maintenance costs
are introduced as the same key has to be hardcoded inside the firmware and printed
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on the device. Therefore, a convenient and secure pairing approach to establishing a
secured communication channel is urgently needed.
Another critical security issue is that most IoT devices lack an authentication
approach to preventing improper configurations and information disclosure. A smart
environment usually has multiple people (e.g., kids and adults, patients and doc-
tors, employees with different duties), who have physical access to the smart devices
deployed there. Meanwhile, plenty of high-value information ranging from physical
fitness to financial data, shopping routines, and music preferences is collected and
stored in smart devices. Ill-intentioned users may reconfigure the devices and/or
access the sensitive information to achieve ill purposes. For example, mischievous
children may intentionally ruin the settings of a smart thermostat [44], which causes
unwanted temperature changes in the home and high energy bills.
In addition, environments, such as homes, factories and hospitals, contain many
dumb objects that are security/privacy sensitive, e.g., a remote that controls a drone,
a safe storing important documents, and a cabinet storing medical records. A usable
authentication approach to continuously protecting them from unauthorized accesses
still does not exist. Security systems based on lock, password, fingerprint or facial
recognition are not applicable due to either low usability, high cost or privacy con-
cerns. For instance, it’s very inconvenient to type a password every time the user
wants to unlock a cabinet for checking medical records. Some vendors attach smart
sensors to sensitive objects to detect suspicious events, e.g., the garage door or a
gun safe is opened [91, 93, 105], but they fail to verify whether the objects are being
operated by authorized users or not.
This work attempts to address the above three security issues by using smart
sensing techniques. To establish trust between devices, this work designs a secure
pairing protocol by examining the operation evidence sensed by two devices. Based on
a secure communication channel, it further develops a secure and intuitive approach
2
to authenticating users to smart devices with simple operation gestures. Finally, this
work explores an approach to authenticating the usages of sensitive and dumb objects
by utilizing on-object smart sensors.
1.2 Overview of Contributions
1.2.1 Pairing for IoT Devices
We devise two techniques for IoT device pairing. The first technique allows de-
vices to sense user operations without requiring inertial sensors, and uses time to
describe the operations. The second one, named faithful fuzzy commitment, improves
the encoding algorithm of its vanilla version, such that small differences between en-
codings faithfully indicate small differences between values being encoded, and vice
versa. Based on the two techniques, we design and build T2Pair, where a user only
needs to “touch”, in the form of pressing buttons or twisting knobs, the IoT devices
for a few seconds to finish pairing. The comprehensive evaluation and user study
show that T2Pair is accurate, secure, usable, efficient, and stable.
1.2.2 Authentication for IoT Devices
We identify important requirements that should be met by an authentication ap-
proach for IoT devices based on their unique characteristics. We introduce a virtual
sensing technique, for sensing and describing operations on devices, that is estab-
lished on the clock embedded in every IoT device. Thus, it does not require any
special sensors or hardware modifications of IoT devices. Based on the virtual sens-
ing technique, we proposes a novel authentication method that only needs a few very
simple operations on devices. It is the first authentication method that satisfies all
the proposed requirements.
3
1.2.3 Authentication for Dumb Objects
We proposes the first implicit and continuous authentication approach for dumb
objects by using on-object smart sensors. The correctness of the approach is solidly
established on causality between hand motion and object movement. It does not
rely on any biometrics, so per-user profiling is not needed. We convert the motion-
data correlation evaluation problem into an image comparison problem, and leverage
recent advances in neural networks to resolve it. The proposed neural network can
be trained using a small dataset. We build prototypes for 10 different objects and
performs comprehensive evaluation in terms of accuracy, efficiency, robustness, and
security.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a secure
and usable pairing approach for heterogeneous IoT devices. We study how simple
operations sensed by devices can be used to extract robust timing evidence for pair-
ing. Chapter 3, based on our previous work [69], describes a secure and intuitive
authentication method for IoT devices. It leverages critical motion events to vali-
date whether an authentication gesture on the device is performed by the legitimate
user. In Chapter 4, we present an implicit and continuous authentication approach
for dumb objects by examining the correlation between the object’s motion and the
legitimate user’s hand movements. The thesis is concluded in Chapter 5.
4
Chapter 2
Secure and Usable Pairing for Heterogeneous
IoT Devices
2.1 Introduction
To pair a desktop or smartphone to the existing network, a user simply inputs
the network password to the device. For example, the WiFi Protected Access 3
(WPA3) [53] uses the input password to perform secure key agreement between de-
vices via Diffie-Hellman key exchange. However, many IoT devices lack sophisticated
interfaces to enter passwords, and thus cannot apply this approach.
Many IoT device vendors usually have the user use her personal mobile device such
as a wristband or smartphone to input the WiFi password [34, 144]. If the network
connection between them is secure (how to establish it is a noticeable challenge [3,
34]), the IoT device can obtain the password from the personal mobile device securely.
After that, the IoT device can use the knowledge of the password to perform secure
key agreement with the router or any other devices that also have the knowledge.
Hence, the problem of pairing an IoT device is reduced to mutual authentication
between the IoT device and the user’s personal mobile device. We also leverage a
user’s personal mobile device for pairing IoT devices.
The literature has proposed many approaches, which can be roughly divided into
at least two categories. The first category establishes pairing on proving proximity
between devices to be paired [144, 34, 145, 39, 85, 3, 116]. It can be further divided
into two sub-categories. (a) As all IoT devices have certain wireless communica-
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tion capabilities, some approaches (such as Move2Auth [144]) prove proximity by
exploiting characteristics of wireless signals [144, 34, 145], which show strong corre-
lation and interference effects when devices are close. (b) Other approaches (such as
Perceptio [39]) make use of the ambient context, like audio and light, to prove prox-
imity [85, 3, 116]. Approaches in this category usually feature usability; however,
they can be exploited by malicious devices near the IoT device being paired.
Approaches in the second category require the user to physically contact or operate
on the IoT device [47, 81, 133]. For example, ShaVe/ShaCK [81] has the user hold her
smartphone and the IoT device together in one hand and shake them, and then the
knowledge of the shared movement sequence is used for pairing. As another example,
Touch-And-Guard [133] has the user wearing a wristband touch the target object,
and the wristband’s vibration motor creates resonance, which is measured by the
accelerometers of both sides and used for pairing. They are generally more secure, as
human operations are involved in the pairing process. But they require IoT devices
to have inertial sensors that sense the user’s operations, while many IoT devices do
not have such sensors.
We consider IoT devices that (1) do not have sophisticated user interfaces like
keyboards, (2) may be located close to untrusted or malicious devices, (3) do not
necessarily have sensors like microphone, accelerometer, gyroscope, etc., and (4) may
be mobile or mounted, large or small, installed indoors or outdoors. A secure and
usable pairing approach that is applicable to such heterogeneous IoT devices still does
not exist. For example, Perceptio [39] can only be applied to IoT devices installed
indoors without co-located malicious devices. We propose a system named P2Auth
(T2Pair, for short) that is not only secure but applicable to heterogeneous IoT
devices. Moreover, it is highly usable—a user only needs to wear a wristband (or
hold her smartphone) and touch, in the form of some very simple operations, the IoT
device for a few seconds to conduct pairing.
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Our observation, verified by our survey of over one hundred IoT devices, is that IoT
devices all have certain interfaces, such as buttons and knobs. Even a simplest motion
sensor, for instance, which detects movement and thus does not provide interfaces for
sophisticated interaction, typically has a button for initialization or pairing (e.g., long
pressing to start pairing).
T2Pair is built on a technique, Universal Operation Sensing (UOS), which al-
lows an IoT device to sense user operations on an IoT device without requiring any
inertial sensors. When a user wearing a wristband or holding a smartphone touches
an IoT device, such as pressing its button for multiple times or twisting its knob
back and forth, salient points arise when the button is pressed/released or when the
knob twisting changes its direction. We share one insight with Perceptio [39] that
every IoT device has a clock. To make the technique universally applicable to all
IoT devices, we use timestamps to describe salient points. On the user’s wristband
(or smartphone) side, the same set of salient points can be identified by analyzing
the motion data captured by the built-in IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit). Sub-
sequently, the wristband and the IoT device can make use of the knowledge of the
salient points observed by both sides to authenticate each other. Furthermore, we
demonstrate the security weakness of UOS under mimicry attacks (i.e., an attacker
mimics the operations of a user) and show how to enhance it to attain both usability
and security (Section 2.8.2).
We assume the adversary has full control over all communication channels. Thus,
given that the wristband and the IoT device do not have prior security association,1
how to perform secure authentication in the presence of attacks, such as man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks, is a challenge. Another challenge is that the user’s wrist-
band and the IoT device may have small differences with regard to the observations of
1This is a critical difference between IoT device pairing and IoT user authentica-
tion, as the latter usually assumes the IoT device is already securely associated with
the user’s token or device used for authentication.
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salient points. To overcome the two challenges, we first tried the fuzzy commitment
protocol [58], which incorporates cryptography and error-correcting code, such that
the two sides (wristband and IoT device) can securely authenticate each other with-
out leaking the knowledge to the MITM adversary and, meanwhile, tolerate small
differences aforementioned.
However, this attempt failed. Our experiment shows that the original fuzzy com-
mitment leads to a high pairing-failure rate, and reveals that sometimes, due to the
encoding process, small differences between observations lead to very different en-
codings, while large differences result in similar encodings. We thus propose faithful
fuzzy commitment, which makes sure distances between encodings faithfully reflect
differences between observations. Another prominent advantage of T2Pair is that
it does not need any clock synchronization between the IoT device and the user’s
wristband, which makes the pairing more robust.
This chapter implements T2Pair and evaluates it on prototypical IoT devices
with buttons, knobs or touchscreens.2 The evaluation results show that T2Pair has a
low false rejection rate when pairing legitimate IoT devices and a low false acceptance
rate under mimicry attacks. The pairing takes only around 7 seconds (compared
to Perceptio [39], which takes hours). A user study is performed, confirming high
usability of T2Pair.
2.2 Overview of T2Pair
Given an IoT device, regardless of its shape, size, installation or embedded sensors,
our goal is that a user can utilize her personal mobile device, called a helper, such as
a smartphone, fitness tracker, smartwatch, or smart ring [88], to securely pair an IoT
2We acknowledge touchscreens allow users to input passwords directly; however,
the usability of inputting a password of eight characters or longer on a small touch-
screen is poor. We thus extend T2Pair to touchscreens.
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of T2Pair (a wristband as the helper and an IoT device
with a button as an example).
device (in order to, e.g., pass the WiFi password to the device or copy data from it)
by quickly performing some simple operations on the device.
Acknowledging that the user interfaces of IoT devices are diverse, we take the
device with a single button, as an example, to illustrate the overview of our pairing
mechanism. Figure 2.1 shows a block diagram of T2Pair, where a user wearing
or holding a helper presses the button a few times to conduct the pairing. In the
process, the device makes use of its clock to describe the button-pressing events
and derives a piece of evidence of the pairing operations, while the helper collects
readings from its accelerometer/gyroscope, and independently generates another piece
of evidence of the same pairing operations. We further design a cryptographic protocol
that allows the two parties to compare the two pieces of evidence without leaking
them. If the difference is small enough, they proceed to use a standard key exchange
algorithm, such as Diffie-Hellman [22], to establish a symmetric key that secures the
communication channel.
2.2.1 Threat Model
The attacker A has one or multiple of the following goals. (G1) The victim V’s
helper Hv pairs A’s malicious device Da, so Hv is fooled to exchange data (such as
the WiFi password, photos, sensor data) with Da. (G2) The IoT device Dv pairs a
malicious helper Ha of A, so Dv is fooled to exchange data with Ha. (G3) A cracks
the symmetric key and uses it to eavesdrop and/or manipulate the communication
between Hv and Dv.
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We assume A has full knowledge of our pairing protocol. Like [39, 85], our work
follows a standard Dolev-Yao adversary model [131]; i.e., the adversary has full control
over all communication channels. Based on this, A may launch man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attacks by intercepting Dv’s (Hv’s, resp.) message sent to Hv (Dv, resp.)
and sending A’s faked messages. We further consider the attacks below.
Mimicry Attacks. If A has a visual observation of V, A may launch a mimicry
attack by mimicking V’s pairing operations. Assuming in the beginning Hv has been
fooled to connect Da (and/or Dv has been fooled to connect Ha), with a successful
mimicry attack, A can achieve any of the goals above. We examine the following
threat scenarios where A has increasing capabilities. MA-a: A can see V, but cannot
directly see V’s hand motions due to certain obstructions. MA-b: A can clearly see
V’s hand motions by selecting an optimal viewing angle. MA-c: A is familiar with V
and trained by learning the pairing operations of V before launching a mimicry attack
described in MA-b. Note that even the weakest attack, MA-a, is stronger than that
in Perceptio [39], which assumes a secure physical boundary that segregates victims
from attackers.
Brute-Force Attacks. A may launch brute-force attacks. BF-online: During
the pairing process, A tries every possible piece of evidence until it hits a correct
one, so Hv and/or Dv are fooled to accept the fabricated evidence. BF-offline: A
may collect all the pairing traffic and perform offline analysis in order to crack the
established symmetric key.
Regarding mimicry attacks, we design experiments to evaluate the resilience of
T2Pair (Section 2.8.2). With regard to brute-force attacks, we perform security
analysis to discuss them (Section 2.5).
Attacks beyond scope. A may be equipped with a camera and computer-
vision techniques to capture and analyze V’s hand movements. Like most pairing
approaches that require physical operations, such as ShaVe/ShaCK [81], T2Pair is
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also vulnerable to such attacks. At the victim’s home or office, the attack is not
easy to launch, as it requires an attacker-controlled camera installed that captures
the user’s hand movements. In a hostile environment, however, the user is suggested
to cover the hand movement during pairing; similarly, a user in this case had better
hide her operations when inputting a PIN or Android Unlock Pattern [115]).
A may launch Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to manipulate the communication
channel and disrupt the pairing. But if failed pairings occur repetitively, the helper
can alert the user, who can take actions to investigate or report the attacks.
2.3 Pairing Operations and Evidence
After the pairing process is initiated (e.g., by long pressing a button), the user
wearing a wristband (or holding a smartphone) performs certain operations on the
IoT device to conduct pairing. We introduce the highly usable pairing operations in
Section 2.3.1, study the sensing of the operations in Section 2.3.2, and present how
to extract the pairing evidence in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Pairing Operations
The pairing operations should be highly usable and easy to be sensed by both
the IoT device and the helper. To devise effective and usable pairing operations, the
user-interface properties of IoT devices should be taken into consideration. According
to our survey, the most common user interfaces of resource-constrained IoT devices
include buttons (e.g., AWS IoT Button [2]), knobs (e.g., Nest Thermostats [36]), and
touchscreens (usually small, e.g., Honeywell T9 Smart Thermostats [50]). Thus, our
design considers the three types of user interfaces: buttons, knobs, and touchscreens.
For each type, we design the pairing operations.
• Pressing the button a few times with one or more random pauses added. A
“pause” here means that after the button is pressed down, the user holds,
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intentionally, for a random short time before releasing it. Note that it does not
refer to the natural pause when a user presses down a button and naturally
holds shortly before releasing it. Our experiments reveal that UOS without
pauses is weak under mimicry attacks (Section 2.8.2), while UOS with pauses
is much more secure (Section 2.8.2).
• Twisting the knob back and forth with one or more random pauses added. When
the knob is twisted, the micro-controller on the IoT device can detect the di-
rection and amount of current twisting. To add a pause, the user intentionally
holds for a random short time right prior to changing the twisting direction.
• Zig-zag swiping on the touchscreen with one or more random pauses added.
Rather than asking the user to draw a specific shape or pattern on a small
screen, which harms usability, the user simply swipes the screen using a finger
from left to right and back again for a few times. Similarly, for better security
the user can hold for a short time right before changing the swiping direction.
All the operations above are simple and easy to perform. (Note that the user only
needs to casually add random pauses once or twice during pairing.) More importantly,
each involves “crispy” speed/direction changes, which can be sensed by both the IoT
device and the helper (see Section 2.3.2).
2.3.2 Study of Sensing Pairing Operations
It is reliable (and trivial) to use the controller or sensor of an IoT device to sense
the button-down/button-up, knob twisting or screen wiping. We collect the data
readings from the IoT device, along with the corresponding time, and regard them
as ground truth.
On the side of the helper, it uses the embedded IMU to collect motion data during
pairing operations. It is thus critical to explore the following questions. (1) Does the
12
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Figure 2.2: The three-axis gyroscope data captured when three users twist knobs.
IMU data show certain correlations with the ground truth? (2) Are the correlations
reliable across different devices, users and pairing instances?
To this end, we ask users to perform each of the three types of pairing operations
(no pauses for simplicity of discussion). The user can decide the posture of her hand
and wrist, and use different helpers (a smartwatch or smartphone). For example, the
photo at the upper left of Figure 2.2 shows a user wearing a smartwatch, while that
at the lower left shows a user holding a smartphone.
We use knob twisting as an example, as shown in Figure 2.2. We observe a strong
correlation between the twisting operations and the gyroscope data, which measures
the angular velocity of its rotation: regardless of the user and her posture of hand and
wrist, the gyroscope data changes from positive (resp. negative) values to negative
(resp. positive) values, as the rotation direction changes according to the ground
truth. (On the other hand, the acceleration does not show such a strong correlation,
as twisting affects the angular velocity significantly, rather than the linear speed.)
This strong correlation can be observed in at least one axis of the gyroscope data.
E.g., when the knob is rotated roughly around the x-axis of the smartwatch (the
upper row of Figure 2.2), the gyroscope signal along the x-axis (blue line) changes
13
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Figure 2.3: The three-axis acceleration data captured when three users press buttons.
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Figure 2.4: The three-axis gyroscope data captured when three users swipe touch-
screens.
significantly as the rotation direction (black line) changes. In the lower row of Fig-
ure 2.2, there exist significant signal changes in both the x-axis (blue line) and y-axis
(red line) of the gyroscope data. We thus conclude that the gyroscope and knob
twisting have a strong correlation in at least one axis of the gyroscope data, which
features significant value changes. It is straightforward to detect the axis of data that
shows the most significant value changes, and we call it the dominant axis.
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Strong correlations are observed for the other two types of pairing operations
(see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). For each button pressing, the acceleration data along
at least one axis has a sharp peak or valley. The gyroscope data does not have
significant changes—when the user’s finger presses a button, the acceleration reaches
a peak quickly because the finger’s moving speed suddenly decreases to zero, while
the gyroscope data is not affected much. Like twisting knobs, in the case of zig-zag
swiping, the gyroscope data changes significantly as the swiping direction changes.
2.3.3 Extracting Evidence
The strong correlations provide basis for comparison, but it is not easy to directly
compare the two sequences of heterogeneous data: the IoT device receives a sequence
of input events, while the helper’s IMU generates a sequence of motion data. To
address it, we propose to extract salient points from the data, and use the occurrence
time of each point to represent it, making it easier to compare. Below, we use d1 to
denote the IoT device, and d2 the helper.
2.3.3.1 Salient Points on the IoT Device Side
Pressing buttons. Pressing a button once generates two events: PressedDown
and ReleasedUp, as shown in Figure 2.5(a) (the pink area shows the duration between
two consecutive PressedDown and ReleasedUp events). We adopt the PressedDown
events during pairing as the salient points, as they can be sensed on both sides (see
Section 2.3.2). We thus obtain the timestamp sequence Sd1 = {t̂1, t̂2, . . . , t̂n}, where
t̂k is the occurrence time of the kth PressedDown. It is worth noting that a random
pause just introduces a relatively longer time span between two consecutive salient
points. We thus do not explicitly identify and represent pauses.
Twisting knobs. Each rotation-direction change is handled as a salient point. As
shown in Figure 2.5(b), the kth salient point is represented using t̂k ≈ 12(t̂
(e)
k + t̂
(s)
k+1),
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Figure 2.5: Salient points for the three types of pairing operations.
where t̂(e)k denotes the end time of the kth rotation and t̂
(s)
k+1 the start time of the
(k + 1)th rotation. The timestamps t̂(e)k and t̂
(s)
k+1 should be close for identifying a
salient point. We thus obtain Sd1 = {t̂1, t̂2, . . . , t̂n−1}, where t̂k is the occurrence time
of the kth salient point.
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Swiping touchscreens. Each swiping direction change is handled as a salient
point, as shown in Figure 2.5(c). We extract a timestamp sequence Sd1 = {t̂1, t̂2, . . . , t̂n−1},
where t̂k is the kth salient point.
2.3.3.2 Salient Points on the Helper Side
Pressing buttons. Figure 2.5(a) shows an example of pairing via pressing a
button. In this case the z-axis of acceleration is the dominant axis (see Section 2.3.2);
the signal along the other two axes are in dashed grey lines. At each salient point of
the ground truth, i.e., PressedDown event, a sharp peak is observed. We retrieve the
occurrence time of each sharp peak, and derive the sequence Sd2 = {t1, t2, . . . , tm},
where tk is the time of the kth sharp peak.
Twisting knobs. According to our study of motion data (see Section 2.3.2), we
use the gyroscope data for detecting salient points, which correspond to rotation-
direction changes. In the example shown in Figure 2.5(b), the x-axis is the dominant
axis. As the rotation direction of the IoT device changes, the signal sign of the
gyroscope changes as well. Therefore, we detect salient points by searching for the
points of signal sign switches during large-amplitude changes. We extract a sequence
of timestamps of all the salient points. The timestamp sequence is denoted as: Sd2 =
{t1, t2, . . . , tm}, where tk refers to the occurrence time of the kth salient point.
During a pause, the gyroscope readings are near zero. But there still exist small
fluctuations during the pause, especially at its start (denoted by the green circle in
Figure 2.5(b)). To avoid detection of false salient points, such fluctuations are filtered
via simple thresholding.
Swiping touchscreens. Each direction change of the swiping produces a salient
point in the gyroscope data trace. As shown in Figure 2.5(c), each salient point
corresponds to a sharp sign change due to a swiping direction change. We obtain a
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sequence of timestamps: Sd2 = {t1, t2, . . . , tm}, where tk is the time of the k th salient
point.
Big silence. It is critical to identify the first salient point. After the pairing is ini-
tiated (e.g., by long pressing a button), as the user’s hand approaches the IoT device’s
button/knob/screen, there may exist some noisy motion data that looks like salient
points. To address this, we simply ask the user to touch the button/knob/screen and
hold shortly, around 2–3 seconds, before performing the pairing operations. This way,
the “big silence” in the motion data works as an indication that pairing operations
follow and the detection of salient points from the motion data can start.
2.3.3.3 No Clock Synchronization
While the IoT device and the helper obtain two timestamp sequences, we cannot
use them directly for key agreement, as the clocks on the two sides are not syn-
chronized. To eliminate the need of clock synchronization, we propose to use time
intervals. We thus convert each timestamp sequence into a series of time intervals
using the equations îk = t̂k+1− t̂k and ik = tk+1− tk for Sd1 and Sd2 , respectively. We
then concatenate the time intervals and call them evidence: Ed1 = {̂i1||̂i2|| · · · ||̂iq−1}
and Ed2 = {i1||i2|| · · · ||ip−1}, where Ed1 represents the evidence collected by the IoT
device, and Ed2 by the helper.3
2.4 Protocol for Key Agreement
Once two pieces of evidence are extracted, the two sides use the evidence to
mutually authenticate each other and establish a key.
3Note that clock drift during pairing does not cause an issue, as the pairing op-
erations take only around three seconds (Section 2.8.5), leading to 3ms of drift in
the worst case (see Section 3.2 of [76]); such small differences between evidence are
tolerated by our protocol based on fuzzy commitment (Section 2.4.1).
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2.4.1 Challenges and Solution
The wristband and the IoT device do not have prior security association(, which
is exactly the purpose of pairing). Thus, how to perform secure mutual evidence
verification, when there are powerful attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attacks in our threat model), is a challenge, Another challenge is that the user’s
wristband and the IoT device may have small differences, e.g., due to clock drift,
with regard to the observations of salient points.
Failed attempt. To address the two challenges, we first adopt a fuzzy com-
mitment scheme (FCS) building on error correcting codes [58]. Fuzzy commitment
schemes have been utilized for proximity based pairing [116, 39, 85]. It allows mutual
evidence verification without disclosing the evidence information to MITM attackers
and handles small differences between two pieces of evidence. The sender converts
its evidence to an encrypted message, which can be successfully opened only if the
receiver owns the evidence that is similar to the sender’s in the metric of Hamming
distance. We call the original fuzzy commitment as vanilla fuzzy commitment.
To conduct the vanilla fuzzy commitment, the evidence needs to be firstly en-
coded to a bit-representation. Previous studies convert a value directly to its binary
representation [39]. But the encoding method may incorrectly consider two dissimilar
(resp. similar) evidence sequences as similar (resp. dissimilar).
For example, given the interval values {121} and {57}, which are encoded as “0111
1001” and “0011 1001”, respectively, based on the definition of Hamming distance
(which is the number of different digits in two strings), we obtain Ham(121, 57) = 1.
Since their Hamming distance is very small, the two intervals are considered similar,
while in fact their difference is large. As another example, the interval values, {128}
and {127}, can be represented as “1000 0000” and “0111 1111”, respectively. We
have Ham(128, 127) = 8. Thus, the vanilla fuzzy commitment incorrectly considers
the two similar interval values very different.
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In short, while the vanilla fuzzy commitment works fine in certain applications,
e.g., when the values fall in large ranges, it does not work well in our case as the
difference of intervals is not huge.
Solution. To address the problem, we propose faithful fuzzy commitment, which
encodes each time interval by first dividing the interval value by a base value to
tolerate small differences and reduce the encoding length and then representing the
result as a sequence of consecutive “1” and “0” bits. The distance then can be
computed as the Hamming distance between their encodings.
Given the base value B and an interval value i, we derive n = bi/Bc. We make sure
all intervals have the same length L of encodings. Then, the interval is represented
as n consecutive “1” bits, with another L − n “0” bits appended to the end. So the
interval with the value i is encoded as:
e(i) =
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, 1, · · · , 1, 0, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
(2.1)
A large base value B leads to more efficient key agreement but less precise evidence
comparison, and vice versa. We discuss how to select the base value in Section 2.8.4.
Assume B = 4 and consider the two examples above. {121} can be encoded
as b121/4c = 30 consecutive “1” bits follwed by L − 30 “0” bits. {57} can be
encoded as 14 consecutive “1” bits followed by L − 14 “0” bits. Thus, we have
Ham(e(121), e(57)) = 16, which is much larger than Ham(e(128), e(127)) = 1.
Therefore, our faithful fuzzy commitment overcomes the limitation of the vanilla
fuzzy commitment and makes correct decisions.
The encoding can represent a value between 0 and L ∗B + (B − 1). It works well
in our case as the interval does not fall in a huge range. We do not claim it as a
general encoding solution.
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Table 2.1 The protocol. The key kr is then used in Diffie-Hellman key exchange
algorithm to create a session key.
Device d1 Device d2
Phase 1: Initialization
Initiates the pairing
Phase 2: Extracting Evidence
Ed1 = Time_Int_Seq(d1) Ed2 = Time_Int_Seq(d2)
if self-checking fails, aborts if self-checking fails, aborts and re-
minds the user of adding pauses
Phase 3: Key Agreement
1 KeyGen(r)⇒ kr ∈ Fm2k ,
where r is a random number
2 λ ∈ Fn2k
encode←−−−
RS(2k,m, n, kr)
3 commits: δ = Ed1 ⊕ λ
δ−−−−−−−→ 4 decommits: λ′ = Ed2 ⊕ δ
t: timestamp of sending δ 5 k′r
decode←−−− RS(2k,m, n, λ′)
Phase 4: Key Confirmation
7 t′: timestamp of receiving a
return message. Aborts if (t′−
t) > 500ms
←− 6 N2||E(k′r, N2), where N2 is a
nonce
8 E(kr, N2) ?= E(k′r, N2).
Aborts if fails
9 N1||E(kr, N2||N1), where N1
is a nonce
−→ 10 E(k′r, N2||N1)
?= E(kr, N2||N1).
Aborts if fails
2.4.2 Protocol Details
Table 2.1 shows our key establishment protocol, consisting of four phases. (1)
Initialization. Almost all commercial off-the-shelf devices have some built-in method
to initiate the pairing process (e.g., long pressing a button); we reuse the method to
initiate the pairing: the user holds her fingers on the button/knob/screen to create a
“big silence” (Section 2.3.3.2). (2) Extracting Evidence. As the user wearing/holding
the helper device preforms pairing operations on the IoT device, each side extracts
evidence independently. Here, self-checking is enforced to examine whether there
exist one or more pauses, and the pairing aborts if there are no pauses detected.
Plus, the helper reminds the user of adding one or more pauses. As illustrated in
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Section 2.8.2, pauses are critical to defeat mimicry attacks. (3) Key Agreement. The
two devices use the evidence to establish a key. (4) Key Confirmation. The devices
verify kr = k′r.
To defeat offline analysis of the traffic (BF-offline in our threat model), following
a scheme of password-authenticated key agreement [10], the key kr is immediately
used as a password to agree on a session key via Diffie-Hellman key exchange (similar
to WPA3 [53]). The forward secrecy of DH ensures that even if kr is cracked offline,
it cannot be used to reconstruct the session key. Below we describe Phases (3) and
(4) of the protocol in detail.
Key Agreement Phase. This phase is accomplished using our faithful fuzzy
commitment [58] and the Reed-Solomon (RS) error correcting code [102]. Given a
set of possible words P of length m, and a set of possible codewords Q of length n,
RS codes are initialized as P = Fm2k , and Q = Fn2k , where k is a natural number, 2k
denotes the size of the set of words/codewords, and n > m.
Given a fresh random number r, the device d1 generates a key kr ∈ P using a
key generation algorithm KeyGen ( 1 ). Then, kr is uniquely mapped to a codeword
λ ∈ Q using the RS encoding function ( 2 ). This step adds redundancy to the
original words with n > m, based on polynomials over Galois fields [102]. After
that, the commitment process produces an encryption of the codeword λ by hiding
it in a set of possible codewords using the evidence Ed1 . It performs an exclusive-OR
(⊕) between the evidence Ed1 and λ, and obtains the commit δ = Ed1 ⊕ λ [85, 58]
( 3 ). Then, d1 records the current timestamp t and sends δ to d2 who performs the
decommitment process. d2 uses the received δ together with its own evidence Ed2 to
obtain a codeword λ′ calculated as λ′ = Ed2⊕δ ( 4 ). Finally, λ′ is decoded to k′r using
the RS decoding function ( 5 ). Readers are referred to [58] for detailed interpretation
of fuzzy commitment.
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Key Confirmation Phase. This phase verifies whether k′r = kr is true. Specif-
ically, d2 chooses a nonce N2 and encrypts it with its secret key k′r, and sends both
N2 and E(k′r, N2) to d1 ( 6 ). Once it is received, d1 records the current timestamp t′
and checks the time span (t′ − t) to thwart online attacks ( 7 ). We choose 500ms as
the response threshold by taking into consideration the time for decommitment and
the network delay. If (t′ − t) > 500ms, d2 may be actually an attacker performing
online brute-force attacks (BF-online; further discussed in Section 2.5) and the pair-
ing thus aborts. Otherwise, d1 encrypts N2 using its own key kr and checks whether
the encrypted result equals the one sent by d2 ( 8 ). If they equal, d1 generates an-
other nonce N1, and sends both N1 and E(kr, N2||N1) to d2 ( 9 ). Finally, d2 encrypts
the combination of the two nonces N2||N1 using its key k′r, and verifies whether the
encrypted value equals the one sent by d1 ( 10 ). If so, k′r = kr is verified.
Protocol Consideration. The security of λ is primarily governed by the size
(i. e., 2k) of the set of codewords [58]. To provide strong security, k should be larger
than 80, which is comparable to RSA-1024. By applying RS, a word of length m is
uniquely mapped to a codeword of length n. The maximum number of bits between
two codewords that can be corrected is Thr = bn−m2 c. Thus, if and only if the
Hamming distance between two pieces of evidence satisfies Ham(Ed1 , Ed2) ≤ Thr,
the symmetric key k′r = kr can be established. The value selection for Thr is studied
in Section 2.8.1.
2.5 Entropy and Security Analysis
We first analyze the evidence entropy and then the resilience of our system to
brute force attacks. (The resilience to mimicry attacks is evaluated through empirical
studies in Section 2.8.2).
Entropy. We use I1 to denote the set of intervals, each of which is generated
without pauses, and I2 to denote the set of intervals, each with a pause. The possible
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range of I1 is related to the specifications of a given device (e. g., size, rotation/swiping
range) and the device users’ behavior habit, while the range of I2 is mainly determined
by device users.
As many human characteristics show normal distributions [9], we assume I1 and
I2 among all users follow a normal distribution each. The entropy (in bits) of a time
interval (with mean denoted as µ and standard deviation σ) can be computed as
follows [92].
Ei=−
∫ +∞
−∞
(2πσ2)− 12 e−(x−µ)2/2σ2 log2[(2πσ2)−
1
2 e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2 ]dx
= 12 log2(2πeσ
2)
(2.2)
Assuming each piece of evidence contains n1 intervals from I1 and n2 intervals from
I2, the evidence entropy can be computed as:
lE = n1 ∗ E1 + n2 ∗ E2 + log2
(
n1 + n2
n2
)
(2.3)
The term
(
n1+n2
n2
)
is introduced to account for the random occurrence positions of n2
pauses in the evidence.
Resilience to Brute-Force Attacks. As explained in Section 2.4.2,BF-offline
attacks will fail, thanks to the forward secrecy of DH. A main-in-the-middle attacker
M between d1 and d2 may construct interesting online attacks (BF-online): after
M receives δ from d1 due to 3 in Table 2.1, it conveys δ to d2, who then sends N2
and E(k′r, N2) to M due to 6 . M then launches brute-force attacks by trying every
possible evidence; for each, M performs the computation in 4 and 5 to derive a
key km. The attack continues until E(k′r, N2) = E(km, N2). The BF-online attack
is thwarted as we enforce a time span threshold ( 7 ), by taking into consideration
the time for decommitment and the network delay. Specifically, the decommitment
time on an LG W200 smartwatch is less than 200ms and the local network delay is
typically less than 50 ms [33]. Thus, the threshold of (200 + 50) ∗ 2 = 500ms should
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Figure 2.6: Six devices are used in our experiments, including two keypads (a plastic
keypad labeled as 1, and a rubber one as 2; in either case, we only use one button for
pairing); two knobs (a large knob labeled as 3, and a small one as 4); two touchscreens
(a 5.2” Google Nexus 5X labeled as 5, and a 2.45” Unihertz Atom labeled as 6).
be sufficient. Meanwhile, it is much smaller than the time needed for a successful
BF-online attack that needs to repetitively conduct decommitment.
2.6 Prototype Implementation
Helper. A user can either wear a wristband or hold a smartphone to perform
pairing. We implement the prototypes on two helpers: (1) an LG W200 smartwatch,
and (2) a Google Nexus 5X smartphone. We develop an application for the smart-
watch running Android Wear 2.0, and an application for the smartphone running
Android 7 to collect the motion data. Both the smartwatch and smartphone are
equipped with a Bosch BMI160 inertial measurement unit containing a triple-axis
accelerometer and a triple-axis gyroscope.
IoT device. A variety of IoT devices are used to build the prototypes, as shown
in Fig. 2.6. (1) Buttons made of two different materials are used: a plastic keypad
labeled as 1, and a rubber one labeled as 2. An Arduino board MKR1000 is adopted
to interface with the rubber keypad, and the communication is via the Wi-Fi module
of MKR1000. The plastic one has a Bluetooth module to communicate with the
helper. (2) Knobs with two different sizes are used: a large knob labeled as 3, and a
small one labeled as 4. The large knob is a volume controller for desktop; we write
an interface function to read its data. For the small one, we use an Arduino board
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MKR1000 to build its interface. (3) Touchscreens with two different sizes are used:
Nexus 5X labeled as 5 has a screen size of 5.2", and Unihertz Atom labeled as 6 has
a screen size of 2.45". We implement an application to collect the touch trajectory
on the screen and record the coordinates of each touch point in the xy-plane of the
screen.
2.7 Data Collection
We build two datasets: (1) Dataset I is used to measure the accuracy of our
system, and (2) Dataset II is used to analyze the resistance of our system to mimicry
attacks.
We recruit 20 participants: 14 males and 6 females with ages ranging from 18
to 36. We use three devices, including the large knob, the plastic keypad, and the
Nexus 5X smartphone, to collect data (the other three devices are used to evaluate
the stability of the system, presented in Section 2.8.4).
2.7.1 Dataset I for Evaluating Accuracy
To build Dataset I, we ask each participant to wear a smartwatch and perform the
pairing operations on each of the three devices for 30 times. In addition, to measure
the impact of pauses, the participation is asked to perform two types of pairing each
time: one without pauses, and another with random pauses (the user can choose to
add one or two pauses during the pairing operations).
Positive pairs. When a participant performs the pairing operations on a device,
we collect one positive data pair from the smartwatch and device. Thus, for the
pairing operations without pauses, our dataset contains 1,800 (= 20×30×3) positive
pairs, each with a label s = 1; for the pairing operations with random pauses, we also
collect 1,800 (= 20× 30× 3) positive pairs, each with a label s = 1.
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Negative pairs. Assuming two users, µ1 and µ2, perform the same pairing
operations on two devices, the evidence Ed1 from µ1’s device and the evidence Eh2
from µ2’s helper constitute a negative pair; similarly, the evidence Eh1 from µ1’s
helper and the evidence Ed2 from µ2’s device constitute another negative pair.
By randomly selecting two users performing the same pairing operations, we gen-
erate 1,800 negative pairs (the same amount as the positive pairs) for the pairing
operations without pauses, and 1,800 negative pairs for the pairing operations with
pauses, each with a label s = −1.
2.7.2 Dataset II for Evaluating Resilience to Mimicry Attacks
To build Dataset II, we have 10 participants act as victims and the other 10 as
attackers. We consider the three attack settings, MA-a, MA-b, and MA-c, as
discussed in Thread Model in Section 2.2.
For MA-c (trained attacks), we first ask each victim to perform pairing on
each type of device for five times, and record a video of each pairing. Each attacker
is trained by watching the corresponding video as many times as needed to train
herself. The attacker only needs to learn one victim’s actions and launches attacks
against that victim. During the training, we provide the attackers with immediate
feedback on the differences between their evidence and the victims’, so that they can
adapt their operations to mimic better.
For each attack setting, each pair of attacker and victim perform the pairing op-
erations with/without pauses on each device for 15 times. Given 4 pieces of evidence:
EdV from V’s device, EhV from V’s helper, EdA from A’s device, and EhA from A’s
helper, two kinds of evidence pairs are constructed based on the attackers’ goal.
(G1 ) The first pair consists of EhV and EdA , implying that A attempts to have
V’s helper accept a pairing with A’s device.
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(G2 ) The second pair consists of EdV and EhA , implying that A attempts to fool
V’s device into pairing with A’s helper.
For each attack setting, we collect 900 evidence pairs for the pairing operations
without pauses, containing 450 (= 10×15×3) G1 pairs and 450 G2 pairs. We collect
the same number of pairs for the pairing operations with pauses.
2.8 Evaluation
We conducted four in-lab studies to evaluate T2Pair in terms of pairing accuracy,
security, stability, and efficiency. The first study (Section 2.8.1) examines its pairing
accuracy. The second (Section 2.8.2) evaluates the resilience of our system to mimicry
attacks. The third (Section 2.8.3) evaluates the randomness and entropy of evidence.
The fourth (Section 2.8.4) tests the stability of T2Pair under different parameters
and experimental settings. The time efficiency is evaluated in Section 2.8.5.
2.8.1 Pairing Accuracy
We use False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance Rate (FAR) to measure
the pairing accuracy. 1) FRR is the rate that our system fails to pair the legitimate
user’s IoT device with the helper. A low FRR is important for usability. 2) FAR is
the rate that our system pairs the legitimate user’s IoT device (resp. helper) with
the attacker’s helper (resp. IoT device). So a low FAR is critical for security.
Given a pairing operation, T2Pair accepts the pairing if a shared key can be
successfully derived from a pair of evidence that has a Hamming distance smaller
than the threshold (see Section 2.4.1). The threshold (Thr) indicates the allowed
evidence difference for T2Pair to accept a pairing. A false rejection occurs if T2Pair
obtains Ham(Ed1 , Ed2) > Thr for a legal pairing of d1 and d2, and a false acceptance
if Ham(Ed1 , Ed3) < Thr for an illegal pairing of d1 and d3. The evidence length
is defined as the number of time intervals it contains. For pairings with pauses, we
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(c) Screen-based device pairing.
Figure 2.7: FAR and FRR with different threshold values for pairing operations
without random pauses.
set the evidence length to 7 for knobs, and 6 for both touchscreens and buttons (see
Evidence Length in Section 2.8.4). For pairings without pauses, we set the evidence
length to 8 for all devices.
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Figure 2.8: FAR and FRR with different threshold values for pairing operations with
random pauses.
We use Dataset I to evaluate the accuracy of T2Pair, and compare the per-
formance between the pairing operations with and without pauses. Figure 2.7 and
Figure 2.8 show the performance in terms of FAR and FRR by varying the threshold
30
of Hamming distance. We choose the base value as 10ms (Base Value is studied in
Section 2.8.4).
As expected, the larger the threshold, the lower the FRR (better usability), but
the higher the FAR (worse security). Figure 2.7 presents the results for pairings
without pauses. By choosing the threshold that yields an FRR 0.10 (we consider
an error below 0.10 is reasonably good for usability), we can achieve an FAR 0.02,
0.03, and 0.09 for buttons, knobs, and screens, respectively (see the vertical dashed
lines). A FRR of 0.10 means that on average 10 out of 100 pairing attempts fail,
and thus a user is expected to perform 100/90=1.1 pairing attempts for pairing one
device.
Figure 2.8 shows the performance when random pauses are introduced during
pairing. We can see that FAR can be significantly improved—FAR grows very slowly
as the threshold value increases. The result indicates that random pauses can enhance
the discriminability of each pairing. If security is particularly important for certain
applications, we can set the FAR as 0.00 and T2Pair achieves (FAR, FRR)=(0.00,
0.03) for buttons, (0.00, 0.09) for knobs, and (0.00, 0.07) for screens (see the vertical
dashed lines). Thus, security is much improved with usability keeping good.
But if vanilla fuzzy commitment (Section 2.4.1) is used, we can only achieve
(FAR, FRR) (0.00, 0.81) for buttons, (0.00, 0.48) for knobs, and (0.00, 0.73) for
screens, showing heavily degraded accuracies.
2.8.2 Resilience to Mimicry Attacks
This section evaluates the resilience of T2Pair (based on the thresholds selected
in Section 2.8.1) to mimicry attacks for two types of pairing operations: one without
pauses (Type-I ) and the other with pauses (Type-II ). We use FAR to measure the
success rate of attacks.
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Table 2.2 FARs under mimicry attacks. (Legend: Ai stands for the ith attacker.)
Attacks Pauses? Device A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 Avg.
MA-a
No
Button 0.07 0.0 0.13 0.0 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.040
Knob 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.13 0.0 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.047
Screen 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.093
Yes
Button 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.007
Knob 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.000
Screen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.007
MA-b
No
Button 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.13 0.13 0.093
Knob 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.20 0.0 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.100
Screen 0.07 0.13 0.33 0.27 0.20 0.33 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.07 0.180
Yes
Button 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.020
Knob 0.07 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.13 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.040
Screen 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.020
MA-c
No
Button 0.20 0.27 0.27 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.33 0.27 0.33 0.27 0.274
Knob 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.33 0.20 0.13 0.27 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.240
Screen 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.27 0.33 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.180
Yes
Button 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.040
Knob 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.13 0.0 0.040
Screen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.07 0.0 0.0 0.13 0.0 0.027
Resilience to MA-a. The attacker (A) stands behind the victim (V) with a
distance of 2–3 meters and does not have a clear view of V’s hand movements. We
use Dataset II, consisting of 900 data pairs for the Type-I pairing operations and 900
pairs for the Type-II pairing operations (Section 2.7.2), to evaluate the resilience.
As shown in Table 2.2, for the Type-I pairing operations, T2Pair can success-
fully identify 96.0%, 95.3% and 90.7% of attacks on buttons, knobs, and screens,
respectively. The performance can be greatly improved if the random pauses are
considered—specifically, for the Type-II operations, T2Pair can successfully defend
against all the attacks on knobs, and 99.3% of attacks on screens and buttons.
Resilience to MA-b. A stands next to V and has a clear view of V’s hand
movements. As shown in Table 2.2, for the Type-I operations, the attackers’ success
rate increases, especially for the screen-based device. However, for the Type-II oper-
ations, the attackers’ success rate is still very low. The results demonstrate that the
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Table 2.3 NIST statistical test results. A p-value
greater than 0.01 indicates a randomness test is passed.
Test p-valueButton Knob Screen
Frequency 0.327 0.581 0.300
Block Frequency 0.854 0.118 0.807
Runs 0.190 0.697 0.046
Longest Run 0.249 0.624 0.164
Approximate Entropy 0.051 0.369 0.095
FFT 0.567 0.567 0.829
Cumulative Sums (Fwd) 0.537 0.318 0.505
Cumulative Sums (Rev) 0.476 0.681 0.343
Serial 0.387 0.251 0.3600.601 0.074 0.796
random pauses during each pairing can greatly increase the difficulty for attackers
to mimic the victims’ hand movements. Thus, the pairing operations with random
pauses are more secure.
Resilience to MA-c. A is well trained by learning the pairing operations of V,
and then launches mimicry attacks when A has a clear view of V’s hand movements
(Section 2.7.2). It shows that, compared to Type-II operations, FARs for the Type-
I operations increase sharply (up to 27.4%), which reveals a noticeable weakness
of pairing without pauses. The pauses make the intervals more unpredictable and
difficult to mimic. To eliminate the weakness, our protocol performs self-checking at
Phase 2 in Table 2.1, which aborts pairing if there are no pauses.
2.8.3 Randomness and Entropy
Randomness. The randomness level of the time interval between two consecutive
events directly affects the entropy of evidence. We notice that it ranges from large val-
ues when the user pauses to small ones when she presses/twists/swipes quickly. It is
challenging to examine their randomness as sufficient samples are required. The prior
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Figure 2.9: Time interval distributions.
work [81, 39] also confirms this challenge and directly assumes the human generated
events are random.
We instead examine the randomness of the collected intervals over a limited range.
Similar to H2H [106], we assume at least the six least significant bits of the time
intervals are randomly distributed. We verify the randomness assumption by applying
NIST statistical test suite [107] on the distribution of our time interval bits. It is a
widely used randomness test suit and has been used in prior work [106, 136]. Our
dataset (Dataset I and II) has a size of 19.2 Kbits consisting of 3200 intervals for each
type of pairing operations.
The outputs of the NIST tests are p-values. A p-value represents the probability
that the input bit sequence is generated by a random bit generator [107]. If a p-value
is less than a chosen critical value (usually 0.01), the null hypothesis for randomness
is rejected. Table 2.3 shows that all the p-values are larger than 0.01 for the three
types of devices. The results verify our randomness assumption.
Entropy evaluation using a real-world dataset. Fig. 2.9 shows the distribu-
tions of the time intervals of I1 and I2 (I1 and I2 are defined in Section 2.5) among all
the users. We test the normality of the distributions with one-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov testing [71]. For each device, more than 86% of the time intervals follow the
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Table 2.4 Average entropy and estimated bit rate.
Button Knob Screen
σ of I1 (ms) 67 72 53
σ of I2 (ms) 501 362 424
Entropy (bits) 34.3–38.5 34.3–37.9 32.3–36.6
Bit Rate (bit/sec) 10.3–13.2 10.6–13.6 11.6–14.8
normality assumption. Thus, most of the data for each device could be abstracted
into a normal distribution. The prior studies [21, 61] of keystrokes and/or screen
touches are consistent with our finding.
Based on the normal distribution of time intervals, we derive the equations of the
entropy and bit rate in Section 2.5. We then use the pairing operations on buttons as
an example to compute the entropy. The intervals of I1 mostly fall in [100ms, 500ms]
with the standard deviation σ1 67ms, while those of I2 in [800ms, 3000ms] with the
standard deviation σ2 501ms. With the base value = 10ms (see Section 2.8.4), σ1
and σ2 become 6.7 and 50.1, respectively. According to our entropy definition in
Equation 2.2, the entropy for intervals of I1 is around 4.8 bits, and I2 around 7.7 bits.
As each piece of evidence consists of 4 (or 5) intervals of I1 and 2 (or 1) intervals of
I2, the total entropy is around 38.5 (or 34.3) bits. The mean values for the intervals
of I1 and I2 are 238ms and 1402ms, respectively, so the total time for generating a
piece of evidence is 3756ms (or 2592ms). The bit rate is around 10.3 bit/s (or 13.2
bit/s).
2.8.4 Stability
In this section, we evaluate the impact of different parameters and experimental
settings. For the following experiments, we focus on the pairing operations with
random pauses.
Evidence length. The evidence length is represented as the number of time
intervals, which is related to the number of salient points. Longer evidence provides
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Figure 2.10: Impacts of different parameters and experimental settings.
better security, but also requires longer time to finish the pairing, which sacrifices
usability. Thus, the evidence length is a trade-off between security and usability.
To study its impact, we set the FRR to a fixed value 0.05, and examine the changes
of the FAR as the value of the evidence length varies. Figure 2.10(a) shows the FARs
with different evidence lengths for the three types of devices. As expected, if the
evidence length is longer, the FAR is lower—the security is better. For knob-based
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devices, an evidence length 7 is appropriate as a longer length can only improve the
FAR a little bit. For both button-based and screen-based devices, the FAR is below
0.01 if the evidence length is longer than 6. Hence, 6 is an appropriate length for
them.
Base value. The base value is used to encode the time intervals. In general, a
larger base value may generate a less accurate encoding of a time interval because
of more coarse approximations, but it can provide a shorter encoding of an evidence
that is more efficient. Thus, selecting an appropriate base value is a trade-off between
accuracy and efficiency. For simplicity, we use EER to study the impact of the base
value by weighting the FAR and FRR equally.
Figure 2.10(b) shows the EERs for the three types of pairing by varying the base
value from 1 to 30. We find that the EER grows slowly as the base value increases.
Although a base value smaller than 10 can slightly improve the EERs, it also generates
long evidence. Considering both accuracy and efficiency, we choose the base value as
10.
Sampling rate. The sensor data from the wristband (“helper”) is used to extract
salient points and generate the evidence. A low sampling rate of the sensor data may
result in inaccuracy in detecting salient points or even miss some salient points. While
a high sampling rate can help capture more subtle motions, it also introduces higher
burdens on data collection. An optimal sampling rate needs to be determined by
considering both accuracy and efficiency.
Figure 2.10(c) presents the performance of T2Pair by changing the sampling rate
from 10Hz to 100Hz at a step of 10Hz. We observe that button clicking requires a
sampling rate higher than 80Hz to achieve the best performance, and knob rotation
and screen swiping only require a sampling rate higher than 50Hz. We thus select a
sampling rate of 80Hz, 50Hz, and 50Hz for button clicking, knob rotation, and screen
swiping, respectively.
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IoT device position. The IoT device may be installed/placed at different posi-
tions based on the demand (e.g., whether needing to be connected to a power source)
or based on the user’s preference. We examine three common positions that a device
may be installed/placed: (a) plugged into a wall outlet, (b) placed on a table, and
(c) held in a hand.
Figure 2.10(d) shows the EERs for the three types of pairings in terms of different
device positions. For buttons and screens, T2Pair performs slightly better when the
devices are in the positions (a) and (b), while for knobs, the positions (a) and (c)
achieve slightly better performance. Overall, the results indicate that different device
positions have little impact on the pairing performance.
Different kinds of helpers. Besides a wristband, the helper device can be any
personal devices equipped with inertial sensors. We test the feasibility of holding
a smartphone to perform pairings. Note that almost all smartphones have built-in
accelerometer and gyroscope sensors [125].
We present the EERs in Figure 2.10(e) for the three types of pairings using the
two different helpers: wristband and smartphone. When the smartphone is used,
T2Pair achieves an EER of 0.017, 0.031, and 0.017 for buttons, knobs, and screens,
respectively. Since there is no obvious difference in the pairing performance between
the two helpers, we can conclude that holding a smartphone for pairings is feasi-
ble. Nevertheless, we find the usability is not satisfactory when the user holding a
smartphone twists a small knob.
Different sizes and materials of IoT devices. We further study whether
T2Pair can work well on IoT devices with different sizes and materials. We have
two knob-based devices (a large knob and a small knob), two button-based devices
(a rubber keypad and a plastic keypad), and two touchscreens (a smartphones Nexus
5X and a Unihertz Atom that have different screen sizes). Dataset I is collected using
the large knob, the plastic keypad, and the Nexus 5X with a relatively large screen.
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Figure 2.11: Time used for each type of pairing operations.
We then recruit another 5 participants to perform the pairing operations on the other
three devices.
Figure 2.10(e) shows the EERs for these six devices. For the two devices with the
same type of UI, we do not observe any significant difference between their pairing
performance. Thus, the device size and material have little impact on the pairing
performance of T2Pair.
2.8.5 Efficiency
We next evaluate the efficiency of the pairing operations; here we only consider
the pairing operations with random pauses. Specifically, we measure the time used
for performing the pairing operations with an evidence length of 7 for knobs, 6 for
screens, and 6 for buttons. Note that the big silence time (≤ 3s) before each pairing
is not included here; it is considered in the Usability Study in Section 2.9.
Figure 2.11 shows the average time required for each type of pairing operations.
The mean time for pairing a knob-based, screen-based, and button-based device is 2.8s
(SD=0.85), 2.3s (SD=0.66), and 3.2s (SD=0.93), respectively. Our pairing operations
require very short time to finish and are efficient.
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Table 2.5 Comparison with other approaches.
Method (FAR, FRR) Time(s)
ShaVe/ShaCK [81] (0.0, 0.10–0.12) 3
SFIRE [34] (0.0, -) 6
Tap-to-Pair [145] (-, 0.117) 15–20
Checksum [1] (-, 0.10) 5.7
T2Pair (0.0, 0.03–0.09) 3.2–4.1
We also measure the time used for running our fuzzy commitment to establish a
shard key between two parties. The average execution time on the smartwatch and
the Arduino controller is 0.9s (SD=0.37) and 0.7s (SD=0.25), respectively.
2.8.6 Comparison with Other Approaches
Table 2.5 shows the comparison of T2Pair with some prior works. Our work
achieves better accuracies than these works [81, 145, 1]. Moreover, our work is more
efficient than Tap-to-Pair [145], SFIRE [34], and Checksum [1] in terms of the pairing
time. E.g., Tap-to-Pair needs at least 15 seconds, while our system only needs up
to 4.1 seconds (the maximum time observed for performing pairing operations 3.2s
plus the time running our fuzzy commitment 0.9s). Note that each pairing approach
requires some initialization phase, and the statistics about the initialization time are
not available in many of the works; we thus exclude the initialization time for fair
comparison. But even the initialization time (“big silence”) is considered, the maxi-
mum time of 7.1s (= 4.1+3) still shows our pairing is fast. In contrast, Perceptio [39]
takes hours or even days for pairing. We further compare with the related work in
Section 2.10.
2.9 Usability Study
This study investigates the usability of T2Pair and compares it with the password-
based pairing mechanism. We choose password as the baseline for comparison, as it
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Figure 2.12: Usability surveyed using questions adapted from SUS [12].
is current widely used pairing mechanism for IoT devices. Although the QR-based
mechanism is also commonly used, passwords/PINs are still required for a secure
pairing process.
2.9.1 Recruitment and Design
We recruit another 20 participants (9 females) by posting the recruitment flyers
on the university campus. The study is advertised as “evaluating the usability of
different pairing mechanisms for IoT devices”. Most participants are not from our
department and none of them have computer security background. Specifically, 3
participants are local residents near the campus, 15 are students, 2 are staff and
faculty members. Their age ranges from 20 to 70.
Considering the social desirability bias, we do not make the participants aware
that T2Pair is a mechanism that we are working on. Instead, we inform them
that we are investigating the usability of different pairing methods. For the password-
based mechanism, as a Wi-Fi password usually requires a minimum of 8 alphanumeric
characters [51], we randomly create a 8-character alphanumeric password, and show
the password to the participants before pairing.
The experiment is conducted in a lab environment. We first ask each participant
to sign a consent form and fill out an initial survey to collect the demographic in-
formation. We then introduce the two pairing mechanisms (i.e., T2Pair and the
password-based mechanism) to them in a random order to avoid the learning bias.
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Specifically, for T2Pair, we introduce the three pairing operations with respect to
the three types of IoT devices, while a smartphone is used for inputting a password.
Next, each participant is instructed to perform two pairing attempts on each of the
three IoT devices as well as the smartphone to get familiar with T2Pair and the
password-based pairing mechanism. These attempts are excluded from further anal-
ysis. After that, each one is asked to perform another three pairing attempts on each
IoT device and the smartphone, respectively.
Finally, the participants are asked to rate the following five statements to examine
user preferences and usability (the rating score is from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for
strongly disagree, and 5 for strongly agree): (a) I thought the pairing method was
easy to use; (b) I am satisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the
pairing; (c) I thought the pairing method was convenient; (d) I would imagine that
most people would learn to perform the pairing very quickly; and (e) I would be
happy to use this pairing method frequently. The questions are inspired from the
metrics used in the previous work [8, 66] and adapted based on SUS [12]. We do not
use all the 10 questions in SUS as some of them do not fit our scenario. At the end
of the experiment, we conduct a brief interview with the participants to gain insights
into what they like and dislike about each mechanism.
2.9.2 Usability Results
Perceived usability. We investigate the usability from five aspects based on
the five statements above: easy to use, quick, convenient, learn quickly, and use
frequently. Figure 2.12 shows the results for each aspect. The overall scores for
button clicking, knob twisting, and screen swiping are (21.70± 3.29), (19.80± 3.76),
and (21.65± 3.54), respectively. For the password-based pairing, the overall score is
(18.45± 3.37).
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To analyze the statistical significance of these results, we first hypothesize that
T2Pair shows similar usability as password. We use the one-way ANOVA test to
examine the hypothesize. The result of the one-way ANOVA test shows that (i) there
are significant differences between button clicking and 8-bit password (F (1, 19) =
9.057, p = 0.005 < 0.05) and between screen swiping and password (F (1, 19) =
8.149, p = 0.007 < 0.05), and thus our hypothesis can be rejected; and (ii) there
is no significant difference between knob twisting and password (F (1, 19) = 1.358,
p = 0.251). We thus conclude that users perceive better usability with button clicking
and screen swiping than using an 8-char password, and similar usability for knob
twisting and using an 8-char password.
Pairing time. For T2Pair, we measure the time starting at the moment when
a user places her hand on the device (a 3-second silence is needed before pairing and
is included here) and ending at the moment when the user finishes the pairing. We
do not consider the time used for running the pairing protocol as we only focus on
the time used by the user. For T2Pair, the mean time for performing a pairing on
button, knob, and screen is 5.2 ± 0.57s, 6.0 ± 0.83s, and 5.6 ± 0.73s, respectively.
With respect to password, the mean time for reading and inputting a 8-character
alphanumeric password is 9.5± 0.78s. Thus, our mechanism is more efficient.
Failure rate. For T2Pair (based on the thresholds selected in Section 2.8.1),
each participant performs three attempts on each device—there are 60 pairings for
each device. We see 3 failures out of 60 attempts for button, 2 failures for knob, and
4 failures for touchscreen. Then, each one reads and inputs a given password three
times on the smartphone—there are 60 pairings and 5 failures. Thus, T2Pair has a
lower failure rate than the password-based mechanism.
Feedback. We also collect their comments about the advantages and disadvan-
tages of our three pairing operations from different perspectives. We here report some
representative comments as follows: comments from seven subjects indicate that they
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like the button clicking pairing operations as they require little effort and/or burden;
some participants also mention that twisting the knob for too many rounds can lead
to fatigue, but 7 twistings used by T2Pair are acceptable.
2.10 Related Work
Secure pairing has been extensively explored in the literature. It can be roughly
divided into two categories.
Proximity-based pairing. Many researches exploit the characteristics of wire-
less channel to validate proximity. Some approaches [57, 95, 80] attempt to transform
the Received Signal Strength (RSS) values into a sequence of bits, and create secrets
based on the reconciled bits. Move2Auth [144] and SFIRE [34] authenticate de-
vices by validating whether the RSS variances are correlated to the device motions
detected by the embedded motion sensors. Some other approaches exploit Channel
State Information (CSI) [73, 136] to derive a key for devices in a close proximity. Tap-
to-Pair [145] associates devices by tapping the wireless transmitter on one device to
create RSS changes sensed by another device nearby.
The changes in ambient context, such as audio [116] and noise and luminosity [85],
can also be utilized for proving co-presence. Perceptio [39] clusters contextual infor-
mation detected by devices equipped with different sensors to derive a key. Like our
work, it also aims at a pairing approach applicable to heterogeneous IoT devices.
But they consider devices within a detached single family house, and cannot handle
devices in a public space, such as a shopping mall, building hall, or hospitals, as it
assumes attackers cannot perceive the context sensed by legitimate devices. In con-
trast, T2Pair is not only applicable to heterogeneous IoT devices, but also works for
devices within private or public spaces. Another critical difference is that Perceptio
has the advantage of pairing multiple devices at the same time, but some devices may
take a unacceptable long time for pairing (e.g., a laundry washer that is used once per
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week and a glass-break sensor that is triggered only once during multiple years), while
T2Pair takes about 6.2s for pairing a device. Perceptio has no guarantee whether
a device can be paired, especially for devices that do not perceive shared contextual
information with others.
All of the above approaches can be exploited by co-present adversaries. Wireless
signals show strong correlation and interference effects when multiple devices are
close, and the same context can be sensed by the adversary’s devices co-located with
the victim’s devices.
Physical contact-based pairing. Some approaches require users to have phys-
ical contact with the IoT devices for pairing purposes. By shaking [81] or bump-
ing [47] two devices simultaneously, the motion data on both devices becomes cor-
related and can be used for pairing. Touch-And-Guard [133] has the user wearing a
wristband touch the target IoT device, and the wristband’s vibration motor creates
resonance, which is measured by the accelerometers of both sides and used for pairing.
Sethi et al. [117] require users to perform synchronized drawing on two touchscreens,
the resulting drawings can be used for pairing. By shaking [94] or moving [1] an IoT
device according to the public key shown on the display, the key is authenticated.
However, all the approaches above require inertial or touch sensors embedded in the
IoT device, which are not available for many IoT devices. While many authentication
approaches [138, 69, 87, 77, 94] based on physical contact have been proposed, they
all assume a secure communication channel has been established between the user
device and the IoT device, while the pairing task cannot assume the existence of such
a secure communication channel.
There exist other approaches that do not fall in either of the two categories. E.g.,
SiB [82] authenticates other device’s public key by taking a picture of a 2D bar code
which encodes the hash of the public key of the other device. VIC [114] improves it by
presenting the key with a binary display. Many vendors embed a hard-coded password
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into the firmware of an IoT device, and print the password on the user manual, so
the vendor has to carefully make sure the device and the unique manual are packaged
together correctly, which is a burden to vendors [34, 144]. Some vendors simply use
an identical password for all devices, which is a critical security vulnerability.
2.11 Summary
IoT devices lack sophisticated user interfaces and are heterogeneous in nature. A
secure pairing approach that is applicable to heterogeneous IoT devices is urgently
needed. We have presented T2Pair, which is secure, usable, and applicable to a large
variety of IoT devices. It can be applied to IoT devices without requiring any hard-
ware modifications, sensor calibration, or clock synchronization. We designed very
simple paring operations that allow users to finish a pairing process conveniently in a
few seconds. We proposed faithful fuzzy commitment, which ensures small distances
between encodings faithfully indicate small differences between the encoded values,
leading to high pairing accuracy and better resilience to attacks. A comprehensive
evaluation along with a user study was performed, showing the high security, usability,
stability, and efficiency of the approach.
46
Chapter 3
Intuitive and Secure Authentication for IoT
Devices
3.1 Introduction
In a smart environment, multiple users are able to physically access the deployed
IoT devices, but not all of them are supposed to configure the devices and access
potentially sensitive information stored in them. Therefore, authenticating IoT users
is an important problem [44].
However, authentication for IoT devices is challenging due to their unique char-
acteristics. First, many IoT devices lack traditional user interfaces, such as keypads
and displays. Authentication based on passwords is thus infeasible for such devices.
Second, due to cost constraints, it is probably unrealistic to integrate costly hard-
ware components, such as fingerprint scanners and NFC readers, into them. Thus,
authentication via fingerprint scanning and NFC tokens is not an option for those
inexpensive devices. Third, IoT devices are highly diverse in terms of embedded
sensors, shape, size, and installation, which makes it challenging to come up with
a uniform authentication approach. For example, voice recognition can be used for
person identification, but it requires microphones, not to mention various attacks
against automatic speech recognition systems [14, 140, 89, 143, 142].
According to the characteristics of IoT devices (lack of traditional UIs, cost con-
straints, and diversity), the following requirements can be naturally derived for the
authentication method for IoT devices. It should (R1) have no dependency on un-
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Table 3.1 Comparison with some existing techniques.
Method R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
TouchAuth [138] 3 7 7 7 3
ShaVe/ShaCK [81] 7 3 7 3 3
Move2Auth [144] 3 3 3 7 7
SFIRE [34] 3 3 3 7 7
P2Auth 3 3 3 3 3
usual interfaces or specific sensors; (R2) work with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
devices without requiring hardware modifications; and (R3) have no assumption
about the sizes and installations of devices. In addition, like authentication for desk-
tops and smartphones, the authentication technique should be (R4) secure and (R5)
reliable.
None of the existing authentication techniques meet all the requirements. Ta-
ble 3.1 summarizes the strengths and drawbacks of some existing approaches. For
example, TouchAuth performs authentication by having the user wearing a customized
wristband touch an analog-to-digital (ADC) pin of the IoT device [138]. It does not
meet R2, since it requires hardware modifications of the device to expose an ADC
pin. It does not satisfy R3, as the approach only works with devices installed indoors.
Its security (R4) is also questionable (see Section 3.7).
We notice that some techniques proposed for pairing IoT devices may be adapted
to the authentication purpose. By shaking the user’s smartphone and the smart
object (held together in one hand) [81], the shared movement sequence can be used
for authentication. However, it violates R1 and R3, as the approach assumes the
smart object contains an accelerometer sensor and the object should be shakable (i.e.,
small and mobile). Both Move2Auth [144] and SFIRE [34] establish authentication
by moving the user’s smartphone around the IoT device and then compare the RSS
(Received Signal Strength) changes with the smartphone sensor trace. However,
the proximity-based approach can be exploited when multiple devices are near the
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smartphone (or the attacker relays the signals of a remote target device). Thus, they
do not satisfy R4. Besides, they are not reliable to be used in an environment that
has active persons or objects (i.e., fail to satisfy R5), as RSS is likely to be interfered
with by walking people or moving objects.
We present an authentication method, named Pet-2-Auth (P2Auth, for short),
that satisfies all the requirements. It is built upon a technique called virtual sensing
that allows IoT devices to virtually sense critical events when the user ‘pets’ (in the
form of some very simple operations) the device. For example, a critical event during
twisting a knob is the motion changing the twisting direction. Based on that, the
authentication method authenticates users by comparing the critical events sensed by
devices and those captured by user wristbands. It can be applied to COTS devices
without requiring any unusual interfaces, specific sensors or hardware modifications.
It can work with devices no matter they are mobile or mounted, large or small,
installed indoors or outdoors. This method is highly secure and reliable as physical
operations are required, rather than based on proximity, and is resilient to mimicry
attacks.1
While there are many aspects to describe those authentication operations, such as
velocity, displacement, acceleration, and noise, they usually require specific sensors.
Our observation is that every smart device contains a clock. We thus propose to build
the virtual sensing technique on the device clock, and use timestamps to describe
those key points (i.e., critical events) during authentication. For example, many
IoT devices have rotary knobs, and our authentication approach only needs the user
wearing a wristband (or holding a smartphone) to twist a knob back and forth for a
few times. The virtual sensing technique allows the IoT device to describe the twisting
operations using a sequence of timestamps corresponding to the direction-changing
1Devices that do not support physical operations, like motion sensors, do not have
the need for authenticating physical operations and hence are not considered in our
work.
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of P2Auth (twisting a knob as an example).
motions. The timestamps are then compared with the sensor trace captured by the
inertial measurement unit (IMU) of the wristband to evaluate their correlation. If
they correlate, the user identity is established using the one carried by the wristband.
It is worth noting that our approach is not based on behavioral biometrics and thus
does not rely on any user habits.
We have implemented prototypes applying P2Auth and performed extensive ex-
periments on devices of three most common types of UIs, including knobs, buttons,
and touchscreens. The results show that P2Auth (1) achieves high authentica-
tion accuracies (e.g., AUC=0.999 for buttons and touchscreens, and AUC=0.997 for
knobs); (2) performs the authentication very quickly (less than 2.5s); (3) has low
energy consumption; and (4) is resilient to mimicry attacks.
3.2 Overview of P2Auth
Given an IoT device, regardless of its shape, size, installation or embedded sensors,
our goal is that a user can authenticate herself through some simple and quick physical
operations on the device. Acknowledging that the user interfaces of IoT devices are
diverse, here we use a device with a rotary knob to illustrate an overview of the
authentication method (and will discuss operations on various UIs in Section 3.3.1).
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of P2Auth, where a user wearing a wristband
(such as a smartwatch, a fitness tracker, and a smart ring [88]) twists the knob back
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and forth for a few times to finish the authentication. In the process, the virtual
sensing technique allows the device to make use of its clock to describe the twisting
operations as a sequence of timestamps, while the IMU of the wristband represents
the operations as a sequence of accelerometer/gyroscope readings. A server then
evaluates whether the two sequences of data correlate. If so, the identity of the
current device user is established as the wristband owner.
Is a wristband required? No, the user can opt to hold her smartphone in hand
to perform the authentication operations. Our work mainly examines the wristband
for two reasons. First, if an employee needs to operate on many devices, wearing a
wristband is more convenient than holding a phone. Moreover, while twisting large
knobs like the Nest thermostat is not an issue, the user experience of twisting small
knobs with a phone held in the hand is not good. Second, the smartphone being held
in the hand is closer to fingers and hence can sense the finger operations better than
wristbands; therefore, if our system can work well with wristbands, it should also
work well with smartphones, which is verified in our evaluation.
Is a server needed? No, the correlation evaluation can be performed by the
IoT device or the wristband as well. It is largely an engineering choice depending
on which should be trusted and the authentication purposes. If the server is not
used, a wristband-to-thing communication channel, such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, is
needed; plus, either the IoT device shares a key with the wristband of each valid
user beforehand, or digital certificates are used to establish a session key to ensure
the communication security. All the techniques in Table 3.1, when used for the
authentication purpose, share this requirement. Meanwhile, some other techniques,
such as passcodes and fingerprints, do not have this requirement.
Assumptions. (1) The wristband is paired with the server using a secure pairing
method [64, 70], and a secret master key is shared between them. So is the IoT device.
(2) The communication between the wristband/IoT device and the server is encrypted
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and private. This can be accomplished with Transport Layer Security (TLS) using
a session key derived from the master key, and TLS is feasible on mote-class plat-
forms [138], but other schemes may work as well. (3) When the wristband is taken
off, it can detect this, upon which the authentication process is deactivated. When
the user puts on the wristband, she needs to authenticate herself to the band using a
PIN, after which the authentication process runs in the background. Both techniques
are available on smartwatches such as Apple [55] and Android Wear watches [17].
(4) The device has a minimal feedback channel (e.g., an LED or a beeper) [81]. We
use it to tell users whether the device status is locked (it accepts authentication),
in-authentication, or unlocked. (5) Legacy IoT devices support software updates for
adopting our authentication approach. The same or similar assumptions are used in
many prior wristband-based authentication works [138, 77].
3.2.1 Threat model.
The adversary A intends to fool the authentication system, such that when A
operates on the target IoT device Da, the authentication system incorrectly accepts
A as the victim user V wearing a wristband Wv. We consider the following types of
attacks.
Attack-I : When V is doing non-authentication activities (such as walking, typ-
ing, and playing phones), A launches attacks to make the authentication system
incorrectly believe that A’s operations on Da correlate with the motions of Wv. For
example, V may walk with arms swinging, and Wv senses a sequence of motions. At
the same time, A performs authentication operations on Da in an attempt to align
each operation on Da with the motion of Wv.
Attack-II : When V is performing an authentication on another device Dv, A may
launch attacks on Da by mimicking V’s operations. A may have following three levels
of capabilities to launch this type of attacks. (a) A cannot directly see V’s hand
52
movements due to certain obstructions. (b) A can clearly see V’s operations on Dv.
(c) Besides a clear view, A is familiar with the authentication system and knows
what information is critical for a successful authentication, which helps A focus on
key hand movements of V.
Attack-III : A can launch energy attacks [134] by performing repetitive interactions
with Da to initiate authentications. This will cause unnecessary energy consumption
on both the IoT device and valid wristbands.
Our work can defend against all the three types of attacks above. The defenses
are discussed in Section 3.3.5.
Attacks beyond scope. A may be equipped with a camera and a computer
assisted by computer-vision techniques to capture and analyze V’s hand movements
and reproduce them on Da timely. Such attacks can defeat our approach but they
require an attacker-controlled camera that captures V’s operations and a robot to
reproduce them.
When an authentication process starts, the server needs to contact the wristbands
of all the valid users of the IoT device (detailed in Section 3.3.2), which leaks the
information that “someone is trying to authenticate.” This leads to privacy leakage
and may be exploited by attackers. How to address it is out of the scope of this work.
Denial-of-Service is possible by jamming the wireless traffic. But if failed authenti-
cations occur repetitively, the system can alert security staffs to investigate. Besides,
there already have some mature solutions [7, 98] to jamming attacks.
3.3 System Design
In order to implement the “pet-to-auth” goal, there are multiple tasks to be re-
solved. First, how to design usable and effective authentication operations (Sec-
tion 3.3.1)? Second, how to trigger the authentication procedure (Section 3.3.2)?
Third, how to represent the authentication operations on the IoT device side and the
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Table 3.2 Physical user interfaces of IoT devices (these devices
are surveyed because they are among the most popular IoTs
rated by customers [123, 42, 99, 46]).
Interface Devices
Knob
(6/27)
Nest Thermostats; Dial Phidget (HIN1101_0);
August Smart Lock Pro;
Leviton RC-2000WH Omnistat2;
Skydrop - Sprinkler Controller;
Vine Wi-Fi Programmable Thermostat.
Button
(16/27)
Amazon Echo; AWS IoT Button;
Triby Smart Speaker; iRobot vacuum;
Logitech POP Smart Button;
Ring Video Doorbell Pro; Lockitron;
Scout Door Lock; August Smart Keypad;
Chamberlain Wireless Keypads;
Schlage Connect Smart Deadbolt;
Samsung SHS-3321 Digital Door Lock;
Mr. Coffee Smart Coffeemaker;
Logitech Harmony Elite Smart Controller;
Emerson Sensi Smart Thermostat;
Leviton RC-2000WH Omnistat2.
Touch-
screen
(8/27)
Google Home Hub; June Oven;
Vine Wi-Fi Programmable Thermostat;
Honeywell Smart Thermostats;
Hydrawise Smart Irrigation Controller;
Logitech Harmony Elite Smart Controller;
Emerson Sensi Touch Smart Thermostat;
Bosch Smart Thermostats (BCC100).
Multi-UI
(3/27)
Leviton RC-2000WH Omnistat2;
Vine Wi-Fi Programmable Thermostat;
Logitech Harmony Elite Smart Controller.
wristband side (Section 3.3.3)? Fourth, how to accurately compute the correlation of
the data captured on the two sides (Section 3.3.4)?
3.3.1 Design of Authentication Gestures
An authentication gesture is a series of operations performed by a user on the IoT
device for authentication. The authentication gesture should be able to be sensed
and described by both the wristband and the device. To devise effective and usable
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(a) Twisting. (b) Clicking. (c) Swiping.
Figure 3.2: Authentication gestures.
authentication gestures, the interaction interfaces of devices should also be taken into
consideration.
Table 3.2 lists some of the popular IoT devices on the market and their UIs.
Our survey shows that knobs, buttons, and (usually small) touchscreens are three
most common types of UIs. Accordingly, as shown in Figure 3.2, we design the
three authentication gestures. (1) Twisting knobs back and forth: when twisting the
knob, the micro-controller on the device can detect the amount of current twisting.
(2) Repetitive button clicks: it will generate consecutive ButtonDown and ButtonUp
events that can be sensed by the device. (3) Zig-zag swiping on touchscreens2: a
touchscreen supports a variety of gestures (i.e., a large design space); after numerous
failures (e.g., drawing circles, writing specific characters), we found this gesture can
lead to accurate and usable authentication. Plus, it can work well on even very small
touchscreens.
These gestures are easy to perform and distinct enough from everyday activities
(see Section 3.3.2). More importantly, each gesture involves abrupt direction/speed
changes, which makes it feasible to sense and describe the gesture on both the device
side and the wristband side (see Section 3.3.3).
2Using PINs (or pattern passwords) on a touchscreen might be good for single-user
scenarios. But if there are multiple users and the user identity is needed for access
control, each user may have to set a username and input it every time. In addition,
if there are many devices, remembering many PINs is burdensome (while using the
same PIN across devices is not a secure practice). Furthermore, PINs suffer from
shoulder-surfing attacks.
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3.3.2 Triggering the Authentication Process
Once an IoT device in the locked status detects a trigger operation, i.e., turning
a knob, pressing a button, or swiping on a touchscreen, it initiates the authentication
procedure by contacting the server, which then immediately contacts the wristbands
of all permitted users to collect IMU data. This way, the user does not need to oper-
ate on her wristband to initiate the authentication. Optionally, proximity detection
techniques (e.g., based on geolocation, RSSI or Bluetooth) [63, 77] can be deployed to
optimize this step by only contacting wristbands within the proximity of the device.
Next, the IMU readings of each wristband are fed to a binary classifier (one for
each of the authentication gestures) to determine whether or not the user is perform-
ing an authentication gesture. Only if a wristband passes the classifier checking, does
its data participate in the subsequent steps of correlation computation for authenti-
cation (Section 3.3.3-3.3.4). This step is only used for excluding those users who are
doing non-authentication activities (e.g., walking, sleeping, and using computers). It
is critical to note that our authentication system does not rely on any behavioral
habits of a user (i.e., behavioral biometrics).
We choose SVM to build the classifier, which is effective in the task of activity
recognition [101, 52]. Daily activities, such as “walking”, “using computers”, “using
phones”, are considered as the negative training samples. We use radial basis function
(RBF) as our non-linear kernel, and adopt the standard features described by Kwapisz
et al. in their work on activity recognition [65]. Specifically, 43 features belonging to
the following 6 types are extracted: Average; Standard Deviation; Average Absolute
Difference; Average Resultant Acceleration/Gyroscope; Time Between Peaks; and
Binned Distribution. We refer the readers to [65] for a detailed description of each
type of features.
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Figure 3.3: Representations for the three types of authentication gestures.
3.3.3 Representing Authentication Gestures
When a user performs the authentication gesture, it produces a series of inputs to
the device as well as changes in the motion data of the wristband. We first present
how to represent an authentication gesture at the device and the wristband. (How to
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make use of the extracted information for authentication is presented in Section 3.3.4.)
The main challenge is that the diverse IoT devices and wristbands are heterogeneous;
however, we need to come up with representations that are feasible on all of them
and, moreover, comparable.
3.3.3.1 Failed Attempts
One may attempt to directly compare the two data sequences (one from the device
and the other from the wristband). For button clicking, it is difficult to do so, as they
capture completely different information: the device provides very scarce information
(i.e., ButtonDown/ButtonUp and their time), while the wristband IMU provides rich
information, e.g., dense acceleration data.
It is possible to extract some motion information (e.g., velocity) from knob twist-
ing; but its motion information is one-dimensional, while the motion data from the
wristband is three-dimensional. To compare the two kinds of motion data, we need to
find a way to convert the wristband’s data into one-dimensional, but there is another
challenge—the relative orientation between the wristband and device can greatly vary
among users and authentication instances.
The same issue above is found when comparing the wristband’s motion data and
the two-dimensional motion data extracted from touchscreen swiping. One alternative
way is to extract the movement trajectory from both the touchscreen data and wrist-
band data. For the touchscreen, it is easy to do so by recording the coordinates of each
touch point. But fine-grained trajectory inference based on wristband inertial sensor
data is still an unresolved problem due to the following reasons [141, 147, 121, 120]: a)
the gravity has impacts on the accuracy of orientation projection; b) double integra-
tion of the acceleration can cause errors which get worse with time; c) the gyroscope
also drifts with time.
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3.3.3.2 Gesture Representation on IoT devices
We propose the virtual sensing technique that allows an IoT device to sense and
describe an authentication gesture without requiring any specific sensors. A key
observation is that a clock exists in every smart device. Virtual sensing thus first
extracts critical events (event, for short) from an authentication gesture, and then
describes each event using a timestamp corresponding to the event occurrence time.
This way, an authentication gesture is represented as a series of timestamps. Below
we describe virtual sensing for each UI type in detail.
Knob twisting. The event in this case is the abrupt change in the rotation
direction. Let t(1)e be the end time of the first rotation and t(2)s be the start time of
the subsequent (i.e., second) one. The difference between t(1)e and t(2)s corresponds to
the short pause for changing the direction, as shown in Figure 3.3(a) (note that the
right y axis indicates the rotation direction: clockwise with larger y value and anti-
clockwise with smaller y value). For this gesture, we have two series of timestamps
of the direction change events derived from the IoT device inputs as follows.
{t(1)e , t(2)e , . . . , t(n−1)e } and {t(2)s , t(3)s , . . . , t(n)s }
Then we combine t(i)e , t(i+1)s and replace them with t(i) = 12(t
(i)
e + t(i+1)s ) to represent
the time of the ith direction change. This way, we obtain SD = {t(1), t(2), . . . , t(n−1)}.
Button clicking. A click on button contains two critical events: ButtonDown
and ButtonUp, as shown in Figure 3.3(b), which are represented using two different
timestamps: t(i)d and t(i)u , respectively. We extract two sequences of timestamps for
these events.
{t(1)d , t
(2)
d , . . . , t
(n)
d } and {t(1)u , t(2)u , . . . , t(n)u }
Since a ButtonDown and a ButtonUp are always coupled, we combine them as a
tuple for convenience of data comparison. We thus obtain a sequence of timestamps:
SD = {(t(1)d , t(1)u ), (t
(2)
d , t
(2)
u ), . . . , (t
(n)
d , t
(n)
u )}.
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Screen swiping. This gesture produces a more sharp edge at the moment of
changing direction than knob twisting, as shown in Figure 3.3(c). The reason is that
the direction change of zig-zag swiping on screen is usually conducted with a shorter
pause time. Similarly, we also extract a time sequence SD = {t(1), t(2), . . . , t(n−1)},
where t(i) is the end time of the ith swiping.
3.3.3.3 Gesture Representation on Wristbands
When exploring the gesture representation on wristbands, an interesting finding
is that, between the two types of IMU data (i.e., acceleration and gyroscope), one is
more useful than the other depending on the gesture.
Knob twisting. A gyroscope can be used for measuring the rate of rotation
(i.e., angular velocity), which makes it a good fit for this case. It usually provides
three-axis measurements, [gx, gy, gz] along the x, y and z axis, respectively. Instead of
examining the signal in each axis, we compute the square root values of the gyroscope
data: g =
√
g2x + g2y + g2z . The combined gyroscope data yields a reliable performance
(see Section 3.5.2) regardless of the wristband’s orientation.
As shown in Figure 3.3(a), we observe that when the gyroscope decreases to a
valley point (due to a rotation pause), it corresponds to a direction-changing event
captured by the IoT device. We thus extract a sequence of timestamps of all the
valleys in gyroscope data, which correspond to the critical events. The time sequence
is denoted as: SW = {t̂(1)v , t̂(2)v , . . . , t̂(m)v }.
Button clicking. Given a button clicking, the acceleration data contains salient
points corresponding to the two device events: ButtonDown and ButtonUp. When
the user’s finger moves towards to the button and presses it down (ButtonDown), the
acceleration reaches to a peak because the finger’s moving speed suddenly decreases
to zero. At the moment of ButtonUp, a valley appears in the acceleration because the
finger starts to move away from the button. When the finger moves away furthest
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and stops in the air for a short temporary time, there is a subsequent peak point;
and when it starts to move towards to the button again, a subsequent valley.
We thus extract the peak and valley points of each falling edge, as shown in Figure
3.3(b).
{t̂(1)p , t̂(2)p , . . . , t̂(m)p } and {t̂(1)v , t̂(2)v , . . . , t̂(m)v }
For comparison convenience, we combine each pair of peak and valley that corresponds
to a falling edge, and derive the following sequence.
SW = {(t̂(1)p , t̂(1)v ), (t̂(2)p , t̂(2)v ), . . . , (t̂(m)p , t̂(m)v )}
Screen swiping. Each direction change of the swiping produces a salient point
in the gyroscope data trace. In Figure 3.3(c), the point corresponds to a valley, due
to a slow down in rotation at the end of a swiping. We obtain a series of timestamps
of the valleys in the gyroscope data: SW = {t̂(1)v , t̂(2)v , . . . , t̂(m)v }, where t̂(i)v is the time
of the i-th valley.
3.3.4 Data Correlation Computation
Once the two timestamp sequences SD (from the device) and SW (from the user’s
wristband) are extracted, the next step is to compute a correlation score between
them to determine whether the user should be authorized. We have two observations
for evaluating the correlation.
The first one is based on concurrence. For each timestamp t in SD, there should
be a corresponding timestamp t̂ in SW that is close to t. A large distance between
t and t̂ implies a low correlation. Moreover, there should be no extra timestamps in
SW between two consecutive timestamps in SD.
The second observation is based on consistency—the time difference between any
two concurring timestamps t and t̂ should be consistent. For each authentication,
the difference mainly comes from the small time difference between the clocks of the
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device and the wristband (although we implement the time synchronization, a small
difference still exists). Thus, if t̂ is ∆T after t at the beginning of the authentication,
it should always appear after t for about ∆T time through the authentication. We
define a pair (t, t̂) that yields a time difference distant from other pairs as an outlier
pair, and their time difference as an outlier difference.
We use a machine learning classifier to determine the correlation of two time
sequences. Below, we present the feature vector and the machine learning algorithm.
Feature vector. The feature vector consists of features based on the two ob-
servations above: (1) Time difference: the time difference between each t in SD and
the closest corresponding t̂ in SW ; (2) Secondary time difference (only for button
clicking): the time difference between each t and the second closet corresponding t̂′;
(3) Non-correlated event number (only for knob twisting and screen swiping): the
number of extra valley points in SW between two consecutive device events; (4) Stan-
dard deviation: standard deviation of the time difference features; (5) MAD: median
absolute deviation of the time difference features; (6) Modified z-score: the modified
z-score of the time difference features; to detect an outlier difference, we adopt the
modified z-score that is widely used for finding outliers far away from the central
point [54]. For each pair of time sequences (SD, SW ), we compute its feature vector
as the input of the classifier.
Classifiers. We consider three widely used classifiers: Support Vector Machine
(SVM), k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) and Random Forest (RF). SVM has been suc-
cessfully applied to resolve many classification problems [27, 31, 129, 146, 148, 137].
It is capable of deducing non-linear relations between the values in the feature vector
to predict a matching score. We use the library of Scikit-learn [96] to train an SVM
which implements the Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) algorithm [26].
For comparison, we implement kNN and RF. During training, kNN computes
the distance between any two samples in the dataset and determines the distance
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threshold to separate two classes. During testing, each sample is assigned to a class
based on the vote of its neighbors. RF is an ensemble method that constructs a
number of decision trees and outputs the class label with the most votes from all
models.
3.3.5 Security Analysis
We analyze the resilience of our system to the three types of attacks described
in the Threat model in Section 3.2. The experimental results are presented in
Section 3.5.7.
Attack-I : The attacker A may launch attacks when the victim user V is walking or
using a computer. Our evaluation shows that the binary classifier (see Section 3.3.2)
can effectively defeat such attacks by recognizing the hand movements of V as not
an authentication gesture. Moreover, even the classifier makes a mistake (at a very
low probability; see Section 3.5.1) by classifying it as an authentication gesture, the
attack still needs to bypass our defense against Attack-II.
Attack-II (a): This probably corresponds to the most common attack scenario.
Without clearly seeing V’s hand movements, it is challenging for A to determine the
exact occurrence time of each input event generated by V and reproduce them on the
target device in real time.
Attack-II (b): It provides an ideal attack environment, where A can clearly see V’s
hand interactions with the device, it is still challenging for A to perfectly mimic V’s
actions in real time. Average human reaction time is larger than 200ms [35, 56, 83].
Such time difference can be detected by our algorithm.
Attack-II (c): It considers a more powerful attacker who is familiar with our
system and knows what events among the device inputs are critical for authentication.
Thus, Amay only focus on these input events and try to generate similar events at the
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same time on the target device. However, it is still difficult for A to consistently align
each input event with that of V in real time due to human reaction time [35, 56, 83].
Attack-III : To defend against such attacks, an RSSI based proximity estimation
is a solution. If a valid user is operating on an IoT device, her wristband should sense
relatively strong RSSI from the device. When the server queries the user wristband,
it provides the initiating IoT device’s ID. A wristband participates in the subsequent
authentication only if it senses a high RSSI value from the initiating IoT device.
Moreover, if an attacker repetitively triggers authentication failures, the system can
warn the security staff, or freeze that IoT device for a while.
3.4 Data Collection
We utilize the LG W200 smartwatch and the first five IoT devices as shown in
Figure 2.6 to collect data. We recruit 22 participants: 13 males and 9 females with
age ranging from 18 to 41. (a) Each participant is asked to wear a smartwatch and
authenticate on each of the three devices for 20 times, including the large knob, the
plastic keypad, and the smartphone. Their activity data is used to build Dataset I
(Section 3.4.1), Dataset II (Section 3.4.2), and Dataset III (Section 3.4.3). (b) 10 out
of the 22 participants perform non-authentication activities, and their activity data
is used as negative samples in Dataset I (Section 3.4.1). (c) 20 out of them take part
in the study of mimicry attacks (Section 3.5.7).
3.4.1 Dataset I for Gesture Recognition
P2Auth implements a gesture recognizer for each of the three authentication
gestures. To study its performance on gesture recognition, 10 participants are asked
to wear a smartwatch and perform the four non-authentication activities: (a) walking
for 10 minutes; (b) typing two randomly assigned paragraphs on a desktop, which
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generally takes 5–10 minutes; (c) playing their own smartphones for 10 minutes; and
(d) performing any other activities they want for 10 minutes.
This dataset only contains smartwatch data. We have 440 (= 22 × 20) positive
samples for each type of authentication gestures. For each positive sample, we ran-
domly take a piece of data that have the same length as the positive sample from
one of the above four activities to build the negative sample. We obtain 440 negative
samples as well.
3.4.2 Dataset II for Authorization Classifier
Correlated sensor data pairs. Whenever a participant performs an authen-
tication gesture on a device, we collect one correlated sample consisting of the data
pair from the participant’s smartwatch and the device. Thus, our dataset contains
1,320 (= 22× 20× 3) correlated pairs, each with a label = 1.
Uncorrelated sensor data pairs. Assuming two users (µ1, µ2) perform the
same authentication gesture at the same time, the time sequence SD1 from µ1’s device
and the time sequence SW2 from µ2’s smartwatch constitute an uncorrelated time
sequence pair. Note that other users who do not perform an authentication gesture
of the same type are mostly filtered by our gesture recognizer and are not considered
further.
To build such an uncorrelated sample, we perform time alignment for each pair of
authentications randomly selected from two users, such that the authentications can
be considered as starting at the same time. As studies [35, 56, 83] have demonstrated
that the best audio/visual reaction time of human is greater than 50ms (generally
between 100–300ms), even for athletes, we shift the timestamps of SW2 to make the
starting time difference between SD1 and SW2 within the range of [−300,−50]ms or
[50, 300]ms. We finally generate 1,320 uncorrelated pairs, each with a label = 0.
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Figure 3.4: Multiple users simultaneously authenticate to different devices of the
same type.
3.4.3 Dataset III for Multiple-User Scenario
It is common that multiple users may use the same type of devices at the same
time. Note that for devices of different types, the authentication gestures can be
used to distinguish users. We built a dataset to exam if P2Auth works well on the
multiple-user scenario.
Figure 3.4 depicts the scenario where n users are authenticating to n button-based
devices at the same time. Take the device D as an example, once P2Auth detects
that a user wants to access D, it finds multiple nearby smartwatches performing the
same gesture and compares D’s input sequence with the motion data of each of these
smartwatches to authenticate the right user.
We consider different k-user scenarios with varying k, where k ∈ [2, 20]. For each
k-user scenario, given a time sequence SD of the device D and SW of the legitimate
user’s smartwatch, we randomly choose another k-1 users and for each user we select a
smartwatch time sequence of the same authentication gesture to construct a sample
with k smartwatches. We then perform time alignment, such that the k users are
considered as authenticating at the same time.
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3.5 Evaluation
We conducted three in-lab studies to evaluate P2Auth on its accuracy, stability,
efficiency, resilience to attacks, and usability. The first study evaluates the accuracy,
stability and efficiency of our system (Section 3.5.1-3.5.6). The second study examines
its resilience to mimicry attacks (Section 3.5.7). The last study learns about users’
perception of the usability of P2Auth (presented in Section 3.6). We also compare
our work to existing work on user authentication (Section 3.5.8). Our studies were
approved by IRB at our university.
Metrics. We use False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance Rate (FAR)
to evaluate the performance of our system. FRR is the fraction of the positive testing
data that is misclassified as negative—it tells us how frequently our system denies
an authorized user’s access. FAR is the fraction of the negative testing data that
is misclassified as positive—it tells us how frequently our system accidentally grants
an unauthorized individual access to the IoT device. We also report Equal Error
Rate (EER) and Area Under The Curve (AUC) of Receiver Operating Characteris-
tics(ROC) curve.
A lower FRR indicates that the system makes fewer mistakes for authorized users,
resulting in better usability as fewer authorized users need to authenticate again. On
the other hand, a lower FAR indicates better effectiveness of the system in preventing
adversaries from gaining access. Thus, a low FAR is good from the security point of
view.
3.5.1 Accuracy of Gesture Recognition
We use Dataset I in this experiment. We adopt the 10-fold cross-validation to
evaluate each gesture classifier. In a 10-fold cross-validation, the data is randomly
divided into ten equal-sized pieces. Each piece is used as the testing set with training
done on the remaining 90% of the data. The testing results are then averaged over
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Figure 3.5: (a) The average ROC curves with AUC and EER of 22 subjects. (b) The
FAR and FRR with different thresholds for knob authentication.
the ten cases. The average false negative rate—the possibility of failing to identify
the authentication gesture—is 0.0045, 0.0023, and 0.0045 for button clicking, knob
rotation, and screen zig-zag swiping respectively. Take the screen zig-zag swiping as
an example, our classifier is able to distinguish zig-zag swipings from other activities
including normal operations on the phone (e.g., casual swiping, taping, and scrolling)
with an accuracy of 99.55%. Therefore, the gesture classifiers are able to filter out
users who are not doing an authentication gesture.
3.5.2 Accuracy of Authorization Classifier
We use Dataset II to evaluate the authentication classifier. We adopt the method-
ology of Leave-One-Subject-Out (LOSO) which is widely used in evaluating authenti-
cation system [25]. In LOSO, we test each subject using the classifier trained with the
other 21 subjects’ data. We compute the average performance over all the subjects.
Through this, we examine whether our classifier is user independent—whether it is
independent of user profiling and can work for unseen users.
Figure 3.5(a) shows the average ROC curves of 22 subjects for the three authen-
tication gestures. Specifically, when the threshold is set to 0.53 for buttons, 0.63
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Figure 3.6: FAR vs. number of users for concurrent authentication.
for knobs, and 0.87 for touchscreens, P2Auth obtains an EER of 0.007, 0.021 and
0.009, respectively. Note that the threshold can be set higher for better security
but worse usability, and vice verse. Figure 3.5(b) shows the FAR and FRR of knob
authentication by varying the threshold value.
We denote the FAR of the gesture recognizer as e1 and the FAR of the au-
thorization classifier as e2. By combining the two components, the overall prob-
ability of incorrectly rejecting a legitimate user can be estimate theoretically as
1 − (1 − e1) ∗ (1 − e2): that would be 0.011, 0.023, and 0.013, respectively, for the
three types of authentication gestures.
3.5.3 Multiple-User Setting
We next consider a more challenging scenario where multiple users use different
devices at the same time. For example, user 1 (wearing a wristband W1) is using a
device (D1) while user 2 (wearing a wristband W2) is using another device (D2) at
the same time. In this case, the authentication system has to compare the timestamp
data of D1 with that of W1 and W2. As the user number increases, the possibility
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that D1 is incorrectly identified as being correlated with some user’s wristband (Wi)
might increase.
In this scenario, to identify the legitimate user for a device, P2Auth adopts a
ranking-based mechanism on the correlation scores for all the nearby wristbands that
perform the same authentication gesture: 1) the score for the legitimate user should
be higher than the threshold determined in Section 3.5.2; and 2) it is the largest one
among all the scores.
Figure 3.6 shows the FAR when multiple users try to authenticate to the same
type of devices at the same time. For instance, in the 10-user scenario, P2Auth
achieves an FAR lower than 0.02 with each type of authentication gestures.
When the number of users simultaneously authenticating to the same type of
IoT device becomes larger, the possibility that an uncorrelated users satisfies the
false acceptance constraints might increase—as a result, the FAR may increase. To
handle this, P2Auth can adopt the collision-based strategy. That is, if more than
one wristbands have a correlation score higher than the threshold, P2Auth rejects
all wristbands and requests the users to re-authenticate. The drawback is that the
legitimate users have to re-authenticate for each collision, which harms the usability.
But if the security has a high weight for a smart environment of large scale, the
collision-based strategy is a good fit.
3.5.4 Stability
We use Dataset II to evaluate the system stability with different parameters and
experimental settings.
Impact of classifier. We compare the performance of three classifiers, including
SVM, kNN and RF, to determine the best one. Parameters of each classifier are tuned
to achieve the best performance. For SVM, we examine the linear, polynomial and
radial basis function (RBF) kernels, and finally adopt RBF. After the grid search, we
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Figure 3.7: Impact of different parameters and experiment settings.
set the complexity parameter c as 10, γ as 0.001 for both screen swiping and knob
rotation, and c as 5, γ as 0.01 for button clicking. To choose k for kNN, we run
tests with k ranging from 1 to 20. The best k is 2 for button clicking, and 4 for
the other two types of authentications. For RF classifier, we test different number of
trees ranging from 50 to 200, and select the best number as 80 for button clicking,
and 100 for the other two.
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Figure 3.7(a) shows the EERs of the three classifiers: SVM performs slightly better
than kNN and RF for button- and touchscreen-based devices. So SVM is adopted in
our work.
Impact of event number. An event for knob authentication is the direction
change of twisting, for touchscreen is the direction change of swiping, and for button
is the button clicking. More events provide better security, but also require longer
time to authenticate, which hurts usability. Thus, the event number is a trade-off
between security and usability.
Figure 3.7(b) shows the EERs for the three types of authentications with varying
number of input events. As expected, EER decreases as the event number increases.
We also observe that four events are enough for knob and touchscreen authentication
to achieve a satisfactory accuracy, and three button clicks can achieve an EER less
than 0.02. We select five events for the three types of devices considering both security
and usability. But the number of events can be configured based on the demand; e.g.,
if the usability has a higher weight, then three clicks for buttons and four events for
knobs and touchscreens are appropriate.
Impact of training dataset size. We evaluate the impact of training dataset
size on the classifier performance. The training dataset size is defined as the number of
users whose samples are used for training. We train the classifier with m (1 ≤ m ≤ 21
in a step of 2) users’ data and test it with the data of the rest users (22−m). Each
user has 20 correlated time sequence pairs and 20 uncorrelated ones. Figure 3.7(c)
shows the average EER for different number of training users. It can be seen that a
satisfactory accuracy can be achieved when a training set size is larger than 13, and
the accuracy of the classifiers converges given more than 17 users.
Impact of installation method. Devices may be installed in different ways
for various scenarios. We examine two commonly used installations: (a) mounting
to walls and (b) installing/placing on the ground. The 22 participants in Dataset II
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authenticate to devices mounted to a vertical board (Ia). We then recruit another 6
participants to access devices placed on a table (Ib). We use the dataset from Ia to
train the SVM classifier and test it on the dataset from Ib. The result in Figure 3.7(d)
shows that different installation methods have little impact on the model performance.
Impact of sampling rate. A higher sampling rate can capture more subtle
characteristics of sensor data, but it also introduces higher burdens (e.g., data col-
lection and communication) into the system. The burden mainly comes from the
wristbands as we need to collect all nearby wristbands’ data and send the data to the
server. To find the optimal sampling rate for the wristband, we study the sampling
rate ranging from 10Hz to 100Hz at a step of 10Hz by downsampling the original
sensor data (100Hz).
Figure 3.7(e) shows the results. We observe that button clicking requires a sam-
pling rate higher than 70Hz to achieve a good performance, and knob rotation and
screen swiping only require a sampling rate higher than 40Hz. We thus select a sam-
pling rate of 80Hz, 60Hz, and 50Hz for button clicking, screen swiping, and knob
rotation, respectively.
Unseen devices of the same type. We have two knob-based devices—the
large and small knobs, and two button-based devices—the rubber and plastic keypads.
We examine whether our model trained on one device can work well on another device
with the same type of user interface.
The 22 participants in Dataset II perform rotation operations on the large knob,
and clicking operations on the plastic keypad. We recruit another 5 participants to
authenticate to the small knob and the rubber keypad. We train an SVM classifier
using the data from the large knob and test it with the small knob, and train another
SVM classifier using the data from the plastic keypad and test it with the rubber
keypad. The results in Figure 3.7(f) show that our model trained on one IoT device
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Table 3.3 Authentication time.
Part Time (Std) ms
Performing gesture
button 1793 (524.8)
knob 1348 (441.2)
screen 1036 (365.2)
Transferring 2s Accel./Gyro. 64 (9.4)
Data processing & running SVM 28 (7.6)
works well on another device (of the same category) that has not been seen during
the training.
3.5.5 Feasibility of Using Smartphone
We also test the feasibility of our approach when a user holds a smartphone for
authentication. We recruit another 5 participants and ask them to hold a Google
Nexus 5X smartphone to perform the corresponding authentication gestures to the
three types of devices. Note that most smartphones have built-in inertial sensors for
motion and orientation tracking [125]; thus our approach can generalize well to most
smartphones. We use the data collected from the smartphone and the IoT devices
to build a dataset for testing. We train a SVM classifier using Dataset II, where 22
participants wear a wristband for authentication. We obtain an EER of 0.0, 0.03
and 0.01 for button clicking, knob rotation and screen swiping, respectively. We thus
conclude that holding a phone for authentication is feasible and works even better.
3.5.6 Efficiency and Energy Consumption
We next evaluate the response time of P2Auth. The response time is defined
as the time interval beginning at when a user starts the authentication and ending
at when P2Auth makes a decision. It mainly consists of three parts: (a) the time
for performing an authentication gesture; (b) the time for transmitting data to the
server; and (c) the time for data pre-processing and running the algorithm to make
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an authentication decision. Table 3.3 shows the time consumed for each part. The
total response time is less than 2.5s. Thus, P2Auth can make a decision quickly.
We also measure the energy consumption of our application on the smartwatch.
We let the smartwatch read 2.5s acceleration data (or 2.5s gyroscope data) with a
sampling rate of 100Hz and send it to the server once every minute for one hour (60
times of authentications are performed). For comparison, we first measure the energy
consumption when the screen is always on, which is 37.3±1.5mA per hour. The energy
consumption is increase to 48.6±3.6mA per hour when running our application while
keeping the screen on. It can infer that our application only consumes about 11.3mA
in average per hour (< 2% of the battery capacity).
3.5.7 Resilience to Mimicry Attacks
Based on our security analysis in Section 3.3.5, Attack-I can be defeated by the
gesture recognizer (Section 3.4.1), and Attack-III can be prevented by proximity
estimation and device freezing. For Attack-II, Attack-II (b) and Attack-II (c) are
more powerful than Attack-II (a). We thus focus on evaluating the resilience of our
system to Attack-II (b) and Attack-II (c).
In this study, we have 10 participants act as victims and another 10 participants
act as attackers. We first introduce them the three authentication gestures that need
to be performed, and then tell them the purpose of this study: an attacker operates
on a device of the same type as the victim’s and mimics the victim’s hand movements
to fool our system.
In our experiment, we provide the attacker A with a clear view of the victim V’s
interactions with the device Dv by placing Dv next to A, which models two cases:
(a) A and V are co-present physically, and (b) A has access to a video such as a
surveillance camera aimed at Dv. We consider our experiment setting as an ideal
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Table 3.4 False Acceptance Rate for mimicry attacks.
Attack Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
Non- button 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
expert knob 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.02screen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.02
Expert
button 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01
knob 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.05
screen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.04
Table 3.5 Comparison with existing approaches.
Method [EER]|(FAR, FRR) Time(s) Event #
TouchAuth [138] - | (0.02, 0.058)
- | (0.02, 0.011)
1
5
-
-
Zebra [77] - | (0.0, 0.15)
- | (0.0, 0.10)
11
50
∼42
-
Touchalytics [31] [0.0–0.04] | - 11–43 11
P2Auth [0.007–0.021] | - ≤ 2.5 5
environment for A, as in a real attack, the environment tends to be more challenging
due to visual barriers.
Our experiment contains two sessions. (1) Attack-II (b): In the first session, we
ask A (non-expert) to follow V’s operations in real time. (2) Attack-II (c): In the
second session, A (expert) is given more information (e. g., following the time of each
direction change in knob rotation and screen swiping, and the time of ButtonDown
and ButtonUp) and asked to mimic V’s operations in real time. For each session, V
authenticates to each device for 10 times. Table 3.4 shows the results. We can see
that non-expert attackers achieve a very low success rate; although expert attackers
perform a little better, it is still hard for them to mimic victims.
3.5.8 Comparison with Other Approaches
Table 3.5 shows the comparison of our work with some related existing work. Our
work achieves competitive results compared with TouchAuth [138], and obtains better
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accuracies than Zebra [77]. Moreover, our approach is more efficient and usable than
Zebra and Touchalytics [31] in terms of the response time and the number of events
needed for authentication. For example, Zebra needs at least 11 seconds and around
42 input events to determine the user identity, while our system only needs up to 2.5
seconds and 5 events.
3.6 User Study
This study is to evaluate the usability of P2Auth and compare it with the mo-
bile App, which is commonly used for remote control of smart devices. We adopt
Samsung’s SmartThings [111] mobile App.
3.6.1 Procedure
We recruit 30 participants in our university. Most are students with the age
ranging from 20 to 35. The experiment takes place in our lab with two areas. In each
area, we provide three devices of the three categories.
We first explain the purpose of the study to them, and solicit their informed
consent to proceed. We explain the two authentication methods and ask them to try
each one for several times. We tell them that the timestamp of each operation they
perform will be recorded.
For P2Auth, we introduce the three authentication gestures and ask them to
authenticate to the devices by performing the corresponding gestures. Note that the
users do not need to unlock the wearables before each authentication.
For the SmartThings App, we create a location (lab) with two areas (rooms), and
add three devices into each room in the App. We randomly choose three devices and
ask each participant to authenticate to them by following the steps: 1) unlocking the
smartphone via a swipe (no password is required); 2) locating the SmartThings App,
77
starting it and logging in using an existing account; and 3) locating the given device
in the right room.
Note that each participant uses the two authentication methods in random order.
After that, the participants rank the usability for each method by answering the
questions in the SUS (System Usability Scale), which is a well-known standard for
usability study and consists of a 10 item questionnaire with five response options [12].
Table 3.6 shows the SUS questions adopted in our user study.
3.6.2 Results
SUS scores. With P2Auth, the mean SUS scores for knob rotation, button
clicking and screen swiping are 72.92±7.06, 74.16±6.38, and 73.21±6.74, respectively.
The mean score for SmartThings App is 68.08 ± 7.22. Thus, P2Auth achieves a
higher usability score for our three authentication activities.
Time. We also compare the efficiency of the two authentication mechanisms by
measuring the time each user spends on authenticating to a device. For P2Auth,
we measure the time for performing each of the three authentication gestures (the
same as the time of the first part in Table 3.3). For SmartThings, we measure the
time from the moment when a user unlocks the phone and to the moment when
the user correctly locates the device. We do not consider the time used for data
communication and running authentication algorithm because we only focus on the
time taken for the user to perform the authentication actions.
With P2Auth, the mean time for performing a gesture of knob twisting is 1.49±
0.48s, for button clicking 1.69 ± 0.44s, and 1.16 ± 0.31s for screen swiping. With
SmartThings, the mean time for locating a device is 16.2 ± 4.2s. Our mechanism is
much more efficient.
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Table 3.6 SUS questions adopted in the user study.
Question
1 I would like to use this authentication method frequently.
2 I found the method unnecessarily complex.
3 I thought the method was easy to use.
4 I think that I would need the support of a technical person
to be able to use this method.
5 I found the various steps in this method were well designed.
6 I thought there was too much inconsistency in this method.
7 I would imagine that most people would learn to use this
method very quickly.
8 I found the method very cumbersome to use.
9 I felt very confident using the method.
10 I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going
with this method.
3.7 Related Work
3.7.1 Proximity-Based Approaches
The proximity-based techniques have been adopted to detect a user’s proximity
to a device, such as ZIA [18], Apple’s Auto Unlock [4], and Atama’s Sesame [74].
However, such techniques can only confirm whether a user is nearby, but not whether
a user is actually using the device [77], resulting in unintentional authentications if
a user is just passing by the device. Short-range radio communication technologies,
such as NFC [29], have been proposed to solve the limitations above. However, the
price of a wireless NFC reader is relatively high and its size is large, which is not an
option for the inexpensive and small devices.
Finally, mafia fraud (i.e., radio relay) attacks have been mature for radio based
authentication [132, 30, 41]. How to tackle them is being actively investigated [19, 5,
45].
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3.7.2 Biometrics-Based Approaches
Physiological biometrics. Fingerprint and FaceID have been successfully ap-
plied to mobile devices, but it requires hardware modifications to integrate these sen-
sors into each IoT device. Heart-related information, such as heart deformation [72],
electrocardiogram (ECG) [110], photoplethysmogram (PPG) [60, 113], and signal
pulse response at the hand palm [79], is also used for user identification. But it
requires special sensors integrated into IoT devices as well.
Behavioral biometrics. A body of work uses human behavior information to
identify users [100, 40, 129, 49, 31, 84, 108, 118, 20, 109, 68]. E.g., SenseTribute [40]
requires the motion information collected from multiple devices to correctly identify
the user. Moreover, it fails for devices that are not movable or do not have motion
sensors. Hallmarks [100] proposes to prepare a dataset recording the gestures of every
user when she operates on every object, and infers the user based on whether the
person’s current gesture resembles the profiled gesture, which makes it inconvenient
to use. In a space with only five users, its accuracy is 63.8%.
Many studies have been conducted on authentication to computers and phones.
They infer users based on their interactions with devices, such as keystrokes dynam-
ics [87], mouse movements [146], and touchscreen operations [124, 67, 31, 68]. But
they are not applicable to most IoT devices, have low accuracies, and/or require a
long interaction time. Our approach does not use any behavioral biometrics, and
does not have these limitations.
3.7.3 Other Approaches
TouchAuth performs authentication by having the user wearing a customized
wristband touch an analog-to-digital (ADC) pin of the IoT device [138]. But it re-
quires hardware modifications of the device to expose an ADC pin, and can only work
with devices installed indoors. Moreover, hypothetically, attacks may be launched
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when a victim user touches a malicious device and thus discloses her current poten-
tial: assuming the attacker can fake a potential with the same value and impose it
onto the victim device, the authentication approach will be fooled.
By holding the smartphone and the smart object (in one hand) and shaking them
together [81], the shared movement sequence can be used for authentication. However,
the approach assumes the smart object contains an accelerometer sensor and the
object should be shakable (i.e., small and mobile). TAG [133] requires devices to be
equipped with not only an accelerometer sensor but also a vibration motor.
Karapanos et al. compare the ambient sound noise recorded by the microphones
of two devices (e. g., a smartphone and a computer) to determine the proximity of
the two devices, which serves as one authentication factor [59]. However, it requires
each IoT device to have a built-in microphone. Moreover, it is difficult to thwart co-
located attacks where two devices are close and share the same ambient. Furthermore,
researchers show that this approach fails if attackers introduce sound that dominates
the ambient noise [122].
Zebra [77] is closely related to our work. Both Zebra and our work can be cat-
egorized as “bilateral authentication” [77], which uses information coming from two
different sources for authentication. Zebra uses mouse and keyboard inputs to au-
thenticate users at a computer, whereas we consider IoT devices that have neither
mice nor keyboards. Our work further differs from Zebra in the following two aspects.
First, the goals are different. Zebra aims at implicit (i.e., without requiring explicit
actions from users) authentication. However, this goal also leads to a shortcoming
that makes it inappropriate for authenticating IoT users: Zebra has high data col-
lection overhead, requiring at least 11 second data (about 42 user interactions) to
correctly verify 85% of true users and identify all adversaries. Our approach has
an authentication speed comparable with inputting a 4-digit PIN. We only need 2.5
seconds (5 user interactions) for authentication and achieve AUC ≥ 0.997.
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Second, the algorithms are different due to different insights. Zebra segments the
motion data and infers the user input events from segments. It assigns a score (1 if
the inferred event matches the real event, and 0 otherwise) to each segment before
summing the scores up. Ours is a holistic approach where the machine learning
based classifier makes the authentication decision based on features derived from the
very few but high-entropy timestamps of critical events, in contrast to the inferred
low-entropy event labels.
3.8 Summary
User authentication for IoT devices supports important applications including
access control and device personalization. However, due to lack of conventional UIs,
cost constraints, and high diversity, authentication for IoT devices has been difficult
to approach. Given that a clock exists in every smart object, we use “timestamps”
as a universal language for authentication. The user wearing a wristband or a smart
ring (or simply holding her smartphone) performs some very simple operations on
the device. Then, the motion trace extracted from the wristband and timestamps
from IoTs are converted to features fed into a machine learning model, which achieves
AUC ≥ 0.997. Unlike prior state-of-the-art approaches, our method can work with
COTS devices without requiring any special sensors or hardware modifications.
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Chapter 4
Implicit, Continuous and Fast Authentication
for Zero-Interface Objects
4.1 Introduction
Many dumb objects are usually secured using explicit authentication mechanisms,
such as locks or passcode/fingerprint protected safes, which require explicit user effort
for authentication and usually have a critical security flaw: if the user forgets to lock
the object back, other users including attackers can use it illegally without being
detected; e.g., a cabinet is left unlocked intentionally (so that the user can save time
for next use) and unintentionally.1 The goal of this work is accurate and implicit
authentication for dumb objects, which does not exist yet.
A body of work uses behavioral biometrics to distinguish users [40, 49, 31, 84, 108,
118, 20, 109]. For example, SenseTribute [40] infers users based on the data collected
from on-object sensor nodes attached to objects. It requires per-user profiling and has
a low accuracy. Proximity-based approaches built on wireless signals can authenticate
users implicitly (e.g., Bluetooth [4]) or explicitly (e.g., NFC [29]). But they are
vulnerable to the very mature mafia fraud (i.e., radio relay) attacks [132, 30, 41].
Zebra [77] provides implicit authentication for desktops. However, it requires mice
and keyboards, which do not exist on dumb objects. Recent systems, TouchAuth [138]
and Pet-2-Auth [69], both consider explicit authentication for smart objects.
1An analogy is a desktop that is left unlocked and unattended can be illegally
used by another person. Many approaches such as Zebra [77] have been proposed to
address the problem. This work for dumb objects is analogous to Zebra for desktops.
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Table 4.1 Comparison with other approaches.
Approach F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
SenseTribute [40] X X 7 7 7
Proximity: Bluetooth [4] X X 7 X 7
Proximity: NFC [29] 7 X X X 7
Zebra [77] 7 7 X X 7
TouchAuth [138] 7 X X X 7
Pet-2-Auth [69] 7 X X X X
MoMatch X X X X X
We propose the first accurate implicit authentication system for dumb objects,
named MoMatch. It has the following prominent features. (F1) It provides implicit
and continuous authentication for dumb objects, which do not have traditional
authentication interfaces like keyboards and mice. (F2) It makes fast authentication
decision. MoMatch only needs one single user interaction, such as pushing a door or
picking up a gun, to make the decision. (F3) It is accurate. The area under the curve
(AUC) across 10 different objects reaches 0.97. (F4) It uses zero biometrics and does
not need user profiling. (F5) It is resilient to attacks. Table 4.1 summarizes
some related work as well as MoMatch, and will be further interpreted in Section 4.8.
Possible Applications of MoMatch. Because of these prominent features of
MoMatch, a variety of important applications can be enabled. (A1) Continuous
monitoring. As aforementioned, once unlocked, a dumb object left unattended is
vulnerable to illegal uses. MoMatch complements traditional access-control approaches
(e.g., locks and safes) for dumb objects by providing continuous monitoring. For ex-
ample, if a gun is picked up by an illegal user, MoMatch can recognize it and raise
an alarm. (A2) Personalization for smart environments. When a user pushes
a door or picks up a TV remote, MoMatch can provide the user identity informa-
tion, which can be used for, e.g., room temperature adjustment and TV program
recommendation. (A3) Smart health. Without hiring nurses to count it, a reha-
bilitation center can make use of MoMatch to collect important data, e.g., “which
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dumbbell has been lifted by which patient for how many times.” (A4) Forensics.
In an Amazon warehouse or an airport, for example, MoMatch can provide evidence
“which package/suitcase has been moved by which employee.” In short, in addition
to enhancing traditional access control by providing continuous monitoring, MoMatch
supports various other applications (A2—A4).
Our Insights. The work closest to ours is SenseTribute [40], which also attaches
a sensor node to a dumb object to collect motion data in order to recognizes the user
identity implicitly. It makes use of behavioral biometrics (while our work does not)
by assuming each user has a habit of using an object. It first profiles each occupant by
having her use an object multiple times to collect her biometric template. When an
object is used, the model compares the captured motion data with all the templates
and predicts the user identity. Without the presence of mimicry attackers, given
merely five users, the accuracy of SenseTribute [40] averages only 74%.
Our first insight is that the approach of SenseTribute [40] loses information sig-
nificantly in multiple aspects. 1) The approach omits the realtimeness information
completely. Essentially, it compares the current object motion data with biometric
templates established in the past. Consequently, regardless of what the victim user is
doing now, as long as an attacker mimics the victim’s historical object uses well, the
approach would be fooled. 2) The approach ignores the uniqueness of each use. A
biometric template is an “average” of the multiple uses during profiling. Thus, it is
easier for an attacker to succeed, since the attack does not need to precisely mimic
an object use. On the other hand, if a user uses an object in an unusual way due to,
e.g., a hurry or emotional change, the approach would fail.
Our second insight is that this behavioral biometrics based approach has to handle
habit changes. A user may change her habit over time. Without re-profiling (which
hurts usability), the system accuracy will degrade.
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Thus, to boost the accuracy and resilience to attacks, we need to recover and
make use of the lost information. To increase the usability and robustness, we should
alleviate or eliminate the habit-change problem.
Main Idea. Instead of relying on behavioral habits, MoMatch is built on a solid
causal relationship: an object has a motion usually because a human hand moves it.
For example, to open a door one needs to push or pull it. Thus, the object’s motion
and the legitimate user’s hand movement must correlate to validate a legitimate use.
The authentication problem is then converted to a motion-data correlation evaluation
problem.
Nowadays, both wearable devices and on-object sensor nodes are prevalent. The
worldwide wearable market is estimated to increase by an average of 20% each year
over the coming years and have 243 million unit sales by 2022 [28]. Meanwhile, there is
an emerging trend in on-object sensing devices (i.e., detachable wireless sensor nodes),
which retrofit objects such as doors, windows, and drawers to smart environments [40,
13]. These devices are typically equipped with accelerometers and/or gyroscopes to
monitor the object status [112, 93]. We thus propose to (1) capture the owner’s hand
movement data via a wearable device, such as a smartwatch or fitness band, which
usually has built-in inertial measurement units, and (2) capture the object’s motion
data via an on-object sensor node attached to the object. When a sensitive object is
being used, the motion data from both the on-object sensor node and the wearable
device of the owner is collected, and a correlation score between the two streams of
data is calculated to determine whether the current use is legitimate.
MoMatch exploits the realtimeness information. Not only the motion data but
also the timestamp of each piece of motion data is used in the correlation evaluation.
An attacker who mimics a user’s object use will fail if the attack is launched too
early or too late. Second, MoMatch makes use of uniqueness of an object use, as
any unique details will be reflected on both sides (sensor node and wristband) and
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used in correlation evaluation. An attacker simply mimics a user’s habit but ignores
details that deviate from the habit would not work. Third, MoMatch does not have
the habit-change issue: correlation evaluation does not rely on any habits, but only
the motion data generated from one object use.
Challenges. (1) The motion data of the wristband is not identical to that of
the object, as the hand rotation around the wrist cannot be precisely captured by
the wristband, which complicates correlation evaluation. (2) MoMatch authenticates
based on a single object interaction, such as pushing a door, which provides scarce
data. (3) There are a variety of dumb objects, e.g., fixed-motion objects like doors vs.
free-motion objects like guns, which makes it challenging to come up with a uniform
solution.
Technique. We propose “Imagified Curve Comparison” (ICC) to resolve the
motion-data correlation evaluation problem. Specifically, given two sequences of mo-
tion data (one from a user’s wristband and the other a sensor node), they are con-
verted to two curves. We plot each curve to an image, and transform the correlation-
evaluation problem into an image-comparison problem. We then design a neural
network with the Siamese architecture [130] to compare the two imagified curves, as
the Siamese architecture performs well in comparison [11, 16, 148].
We build prototypes and evaluate MoMatch on 10 various objects (doors, shotguns,
dumbbells, etc.). The results show that MoMatch (1) achieves high accuracies (AUC
= 0.97 across 10 objects) using surprisingly small datasets, (2) keeps accurate for
unseen users, (3) makes the authentication decision very fast (within 2.5s), (4) has
low energy consumption, and (5) is resilient to mimicry attacks.
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Figure 4.1: System architecture.
4.2 Overview of MoMatch
4.2.1 System Architecture
As shown in Figure 4.1, MoMatch comprises three types of entities: (a) an on-object
sensor node attached to a dumb object; (b) a wristband worn by the legitimate user;
and (c) an authentication process, which is an app running, e.g., in the wristband.2
When a motion of the object is detected by its sensor node, the sensor node notifies
the authentication process, which collects acceleration and/or gyroscope data from
the two devices; it then calculates a correlation score based on the two sequences of
motion data collected during one object interaction, such as pushing a door, pulling
a drawer, or picking up a remote, which takes only seconds.
Categorization of dumb objects. (1) fixed-motion objects, which can only
be moved around some axis or along a glide, such as doors and drawers; and (2)
free-motion objects that can be moved around freely, such as guns and dumbbells.
Free-motion objects impose extra challenges for authentication since the motions are
more flexible, and they are not considered by many prior works [40, 100, 128]. Both
are considered by MoMatch.
2The deployment of the authentication process mainly depends on the application
scenario. For instance, for smart home personalization, it can be deployed in a local
hub or an IoT cloud. We discuss the authentication technique itself, regardless of the
deployment choice.
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4.2.2 Assumptions and Threat Model
Assumptions. (1) The sensor data transmission is via a secure communica-
tion channel protected by a key, which can be established using any secure pairing
method [64]. This ensures data confidentiality, integrity, and freshness. (2) The
clocks of the wristband and the sensor node are synchronized using a time synchro-
nization method [86, 24]. (3) When the wristband is taken off, it can detect this and
any object use will be considered as invalid (and reported to, for example, the user’s
smartphone). When the user puts on the wristband, she needs to authenticate herself
to the band using a PIN (to activate the authentication app). Both techniques are
available on smartwatches such as Apple [55] and Android Wear watches [17]. (4) The
wristband and the sensor node have wireless communication capabilities, embedded
accelerometers and/or gyroscopes. (5) The authentication process is trusted, and
does not leak privacy information (including the motion data). Similar assumptions
are used in prior wristband-based authentication works [77, 138, 81, 78, 69].
Threat model. The adversary A, who is illegally using the object Oa of the
victim user V, aims to fool the authentication system into accepting A as the victim
V. We assume A can clearly see V’s operations and A launches attacks by mimicking
V. We consider two types of mimicry attacks. Attack-I : V is performing an activity
that is different from A’s activity on Oa. E.g., A pushes a door while V is walking.
Attack-II : V is performing an activity that is the same as A’s. E.g., V pushes a door,
and A mimics V to push another one. MoMatch is resilient to both attacks above (see
Section 4.7.6).
Attacks beyond scope. A may use a camera and computer-vision techniques
to capture V’s hand motions and use a robot to reproduce them. This can defeat our
approach but is not easy to launch, as it requires an attacker-controlled camera that
captures V’s hand motions and an advanced robot to reproduce them.
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Denial-of-Service is possible by jamming the wireless traffic. There are mature
solutions [7, 98] to jamming attacks. Plus, the authentication process can raise alarms
if the communication channel is disrupted.
4.3 Data Pre-processing
4.3.1 Data Representation and Smoothing
Accelerometers and gyroscopes are among the most common sensors. An ac-
celerometer measures positional acceleration, and a gyroscope angular velocity. Both
provide three-axis measurements. E.g., the acceleration data [ax, ay, az] indicates the
accelerations along the axes x, y, and z, respectively.
People may operate on an object from different orientations. Rather than com-
paring the data on each axis separately, we propose to use the square root values of
the data: the acceleration is calculated as a =
√
a2x + a2y + a2z, and the gyroscope as
g =
√
g2x + g2y + g2z . The resulting data can reflect the current status of a motion in a
reliable way regardless of the orientation of the object user.
The raw sensor data usually contain high-frequency noises. To reduce the effect
of noises, we apply a low pass filter, called Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
(EWMA) [75]. Figure 4.2 shows the effect of EWMA when applied to the z-axis raw
acceleration data from a smartwatch. After smoothing, most high-frequency noises
are removed and the important features such as significant valleys and crests are
preserved.
4.3.2 Data Interval Selection
The operation on an object is usually a sequence of actions. For instance, when
opening a door, a user first places her hand on the door handle, turns it, and then
pushes the door. After that, the action will be various—some may hold the door
shortly, while others may leave the door alone, so the movements of the hand and the
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Figure 4.2: Data smoothing example.
door become uncorrelated. It will confuse the neural network model if the data of the
uncorrelated duration is used for training and, more critically, require more training
data to get a converged model. We thus conduct data interval selection.
Selecting the start time t1. Our observation is that, for a very short duration
after an object motion is detected, the sensor data of the wristband and that of
the sensor node are usually different. E.g., when a user raises her hand and moves
it towards an object with a certain speed, the first few milliseconds of both the
acceleration and gyroscope values of the wristband are not zero, while the data of
the on-object node starts from near zero. In Figure 4.3, starting at Time=0 the
acceleration from the wristband drops sharply from 1.9m/s2 and gyroscope from
1.8rad/s, while the data from the on-object node increases from near zero. Such
differences can mislead the neural network. To address it, after empirical study of
sensor data for operating on a variety of objects, we find the first 100ms of the sensor
data can be got rid of, as it is long enough to eliminate the initial chaos but still
preserves enough remaining data for comparison.
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Figure 4.3: The acceleration and gyroscope data from a smartwatch and an on-object
node. From t1 to t2, the user turns the handle, pushes the door to open it.
Selecting the end time t2. Three different classes exist when determining
the end time of an activity. (1) For the fix-motion objects that rotate along a fixed
pivot (i. e., doors), we use the gyroscope data of the on-object node to determine the
end time, which is the second valley point in the gyroscope data; according to our
observation, it consistently means that the user has completed the pushing/pulling
operation. Figure 4.3 shows an example of this class, where t2 is the end time. (2)
For the fix-motion objects that do not have a fixed pivot (i. e., drawers), the gyroscope
data is close to zero all the time. We instead use the acceleration data of the on-object
node to determine the end time, which should satisfy the following constraints. First,
it should correspond to a valley; second, the value at the valley should be very small
(≤ 0.4). Our experiments show that this corresponds to the end of an activity on such
objects. (3) For the free-motion objects (such as remotes and dumbbells), the use
usually lasts for a while, e.g., multiple seconds. Our experiment demonstrates that
the first 2s of data is long enough to achieve high accuracies (see P1 in Section 4.7.7).
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4.4 Motion Correlation Evaluation
4.4.1 Design Choices
To calculate the correlation accurately (low false acceptance rate and low false
rejection rate), our design started with the following three techniques, which are
frequently used for calculating the correlation of two signals.
(1) Correlation. The correlation function is used to assess the temporal simi-
larities of two sequences [38]. Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient [15]
is effective in summarizing the linear relation of sequences.
(2) Coherence. It examines the similarity of two signals in the frequency do-
main [119]. For example, Welch’s method [135] computes the magnitude squared
coherence of the power spectral density of two signals.
(3) Dynamic Time Warping (DTW). Via dynamic programming, DTW [90]
finds an optimal non-linear alignment that minimizes the distance of two sequences,
and calculates the similarity score based on the distance.
We implemented and evaluated the three designs, but the performance was poor
(see Section 4.7.2). They each work well in capturing a certain correlation: specifi-
cally, the Pearson Correlation function performs well if one signal can be converted
to the other via linear transformation, the Coherence outputs a high score if two
signal are similar in the frequency domain, and DTW works well if one signal can
be “warped” to get another. However, they fail to precisely capture the irregular
correlation in our case, such as the example shown in Figure 4.3.
We then leveraged various machine learning techniques to resolve the problem.
(4) SVM. Given two motion data sequences, we construct a feature vector for
each, and then compute the L1 distance of the two feature vectors to train an SVM,
which detects whether the two sequences correlate. We consider totally 43 features:
42 features from the famous work [65], which are used for activity recognition and are
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Figure 4.4: The network architecture of S-LSTM.
able to describe key characteristics of motion data due to activities, and the DTW
distance as the 43rd one.
(5) S-LSTM. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) are known to be good at
handling time series. We employ long short-term memory (LSTM), a type of RNNs
specialized in learning long-term dependencies. As shown in Figure 4.4, we use the
Siamese architecture [11], which performs very well in comparison, and the design is
denoted as S-LSTM. The inputs are two data sequences, X(a) = (x(a)1 , ..., x(a)n ), and
X(b) = (x(b)1 , ..., x(b)n ). An LSTM cell analyzes an input value coming from either the
input sequence or the precedent step and updates its hidden state at each time step
(the reader is referred to [48] for more details). The outputs, h(a) and h(b), at the last
time step in the second hidden layer are used to calculate the L1 distance L1. The
similarity score is computed as exp−L1 .
(6) S-CNN. Researchers have found that CNNs work well for resolving time
series problems [139]. Inspired by it, we propose to combine CNNs and the Siamese
architecture, denoted as S-CNN , to compare two time series.
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Figure 4.5: The network architecture of S-CNN.
We implemented and evaluated the latter three designs as well. While they all
attain performance much better than SenseTribute [40], S-CNN achieves the highest
accuracy (see Section 4.7.2).3 More importantly, compared to SVM , S-CNN does
not need feature engineering effort, and one single comprehensive model works for
different types of objects (see C2 in Section 4.7.2). Below, we present the details of
the S-CNN design.
4.4.2 Imagified Curve Comparison
We propose to convert the problem into a comparison problem: if two motion-
data sequences correlate, they are regarded as similar ; otherwise, dissimilar. Further-
more, we propose Imagified Curve Comparison (ICC), which converts motion data
sequences into images and employs Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to au-
tomatically learn important features from those images for subsequent comparison.
We use the Siamese architecture [11], which performs well in comparison, and the de-
sign is denoted as S-CNN. Instead of classifying the motion data according to users’
templates as in SenseTribute [40], the comparison-oriented idea is able to capture the
3We do not imply deep learning is inherently better. However, SVM indeed needs
significant feature engineering effort.
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uniqueness in each object use; that is, any unique detail in an object use is consis-
tently reflected by motion data on both sides. Moreover, as it uses zero biometrics,
once trained the neural network model can be directly used to authenticate users that
are not seen during training; hence, no per-user profiling. Thus, the design avoids the
habit-change issue. Figure 4.5 shows the architecture, which contains twin CNNs
each with three convolutional layers followed by a fully connected layer.
Data plotting and input layer. For each data sequence, we plot it with x-axis
representing the time and y-axis the sensor value, and convert the sampling points
into a curve. Thus the data from the sensor node (or wristband) is converted into two
curves—one for acceleration data and another gyroscope data (if both acceleration
and gyroscope data is used; Section 4.7.2 examines the model performance if only ac-
celeration data is used). It is worth emphasizing that the realtimeness information
is captured by the plotting along x-axis. Next, the two curves are combined to form
an image (Section 4.7.3 explores two ways to combine them). We set the image size
to be 100 × 75 (width × height) pixels. The width is chosen based on the sampling
rate 50Hz (P3 in Section 4.7.7) and the length of sensor data ≤ 2 seconds (P1 in
Section 4.7.7). Thus, the width is 100 (= 50 × 2) pixels, and the height is chosen
based on a common image aspect ratio (4:3).
Convolutional layers. The number of convolutional layers is usually deter-
mined empirically. We choose three layers considering the trade-off between perfor-
mance and computational efficiency (P4 in Section 4.7.7). For the three layers, we
apply 64 filters with a shape 8×6 and a stride of (4, 3), 128 filters with a shape 5×5
and a stride of 1, and 256 filters with a shape 3 × 3 and a stride of 1, respectively.
The filter shape in the first layer is designed based on the aspect ratio (4:3) of input
images. We opt for a larger stride of (4, 3) for the first layer filters as our input images
are relatively sparse compared to complicated images. The filters with a shape 5× 5
and 3 × 3 are commonly used and efficient in AlexNet [62] and GoogLeNet [127].
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For the number of feature maps in each layer, we examine it by looping through the
powers of 2 from 16 to 512 and choose the ones that perform the best. ReLUs are
employed as activation functions and Batch Normalization is also applied.
Pooling layer. A max-pooling layer with a shape 2 × 2 and a stride of 2, is
added after the second convolutional layer for downsampling the spatial dimensions
and extracting shift-invariant features. We do not add a pooling layer after the first
convolutional layer as its large filter stride already performs a sparse sampling of the
data.
Fully connected layers. The fully connected layer flattens the feature maps
from the convolutional layer into a feature vector. Our experiment shows an output of
1280 dimensions works best. An L1 distance of two feature vectors (of the two Siamese
sub-networks) is then computed and subsequently converted into a correlation score
s ∈ [0, 1] using another fully connected layer.
Training and loss function. To learn the network parameters, we use standard
backpropagation procedure to minimize the binary cross-entropy loss function:
L = −
∑
i∈S
log s(M1,M2)−
∑
j∈D
log(1− s(M ′1,M
′
2)) (4.1)
where M1 and M2 denote a pair of images converted from correlated sensor data
sequences, and M ′1 and M
′
2 an pair of images from uncorrelated data sequences. S
and D represent datasets of correlated pairs and uncorrelated pairs, respectively,
detailed in Section 4.6.2.
4.5 Other Implementation Details
Wristband. We implement an application for collecting the sensor data on the
LG W200 smartwatch that runs the latest Android Wear 2.0. The smartwatch has a
Bosch BMI160 inertial measurement unit embedded with a triple-axis accelerometer
and a triple-axis gyroscope.
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Figure 4.6: A sensor node is compared to a US quarter coin.
On-object sensor nodes. As shown in Figure 4.6, the on-object node is built
using an InvenSense MPU-6050 which integrates an accelerometer and a gyroscope.
We use an Arduino board MKR1000 to interface with MPU-6050 via I2C bus. Mass
production cost for such a unit is around $10. An attacker that tries to remove a
node will cause motion that cannot pass authentication and trigger alerts. Even if an
attacker destroys a node without motion, the stopped heartbeat messages will still
trigger alerts.
Authentication process. To facilitate large-scale data collection and experi-
ments, we run the authentication process in a desktop with an Intel i7-6700 processor
and 12GB RAM memory. The process performs these main functions: 1) maintain-
ing secured connection with wristbands and on-object nodes; 2) pre-processing sensor
data and conducting the authentication; and 3) notifying the results.
4.6 Data Collection
4.6.1 Objects and Participants
A variety of objects are used in the experiments, as shown in Figure 4.7. We
recruit 27 volunteers. Note that most prior works invited no more than 10 partici-
pants [40, 100, 49]. More importantly, our evaluation (P2 in Section 4.7.7) shows 8
users are sufficient to train the neural network model. We randomly assign 5 objects
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Table 4.2 Statistics about participants and activities.
Object category Name User # Activity #
Fixed-motion
Room door I
Room door II
13
17
1284
1788
objects
Fridge door 20 2129
Oven door 12 1295
Cabinet door 13 1408
Drawer I
Drawer II
10
20
1062
2108
Free-motion Shotgun 15 1596
objects Remote 19 2107Dumbbell 15 1651
Figure 4.7: Ten objects used in our experiments, including seven fixed-motion objects
(two room doors labeled as 1 and 2, where Door I is a right swing door and Door II is
a left swing door with a closer, which can automatically close the door; a fridge door
labeled as 3; an oven door labeled as 4; a cabinet door labeled as 5; and two drawers
labeled as 6 and 7, where Drawer I does not have handles and Drawer II does) and
three free-motion objects (a replica shotgun labeled as 8; a remote labeled as 9; and
a 5lb dumbbell labeled as 10).
to each participant and ask them to operate on the objects using the hand wearing
the smartwatch, e. g., opening a door, and picking up a gun. For each object, they
are asked to perform the activity for 100+ times, and are free to choose their ways of
performing the activities. Table 4.2 shows the number of participants and activities
for each object.
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4.6.2 Building Dataset
We follow a usual way of building positive and negative pairs for training a Siamese
network [148, 97].
Correlated sensor data pairs. Whenever a participant performs an operation
on an object, we collect one correlated data pair from the smartwatch and the on-
object sensor node. Our dataset contains 16,428 correlated pairs, each with a label
s = 1.
Uncorrelated sensor data pairs. Given any two different randomly selected
activity instances, where u1 operates on o1, and u2 on o2, we denote the sensor data
collected from u1’s and u2’s smartwatches as su1 and su2 , and the data from the on-
object nodes as so1 and so2 . We can construct two uncorrelated pairs, <su1 , so2>
and <su2 , so1>. However, the time intervals of the two sequences in an uncorrelated
pair may be different. We thus truncate the longer one, such that the two sequences
have the same interval. We finally generate 16,428 uncorrelated pairs to make them
balanced with the correlated ones, each with a label s = 0.
4.7 Evaluation
We first compare MoMatch with the other design choices (listed in Section 4.4.1)
in terms of accuracy and generalization. We seek to understand: (C1) which
method achieves the highest accuracy, and (C2) which one is able to train a general
model effective across all the objects.
We next evaluate our model in terms of accuracy, adaptability, efficiency
and resilience to mimicry attacks. We first examine (Q1) whether the accuracy
can be improved by combining both the acceleration and gyroscope data. For its
adaptability, we seek to understand (Q2) whether it keeps a high accuracy when
users are tested again after a long time; and (Q3) whether it keeps accurate for
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unseen users, that is, users that are not seen during training. To evaluate the
efficiency, we measure (Q4) the response time for MoMatch to make a decision,
and the computation resource for running our neural network model; (Q5) the time
used for training our neural network model; and (Q6) the energy consumption of
our application on the smartwatch. Moreover, we evaluate its resilience to mimicry
attacks (Q7).
We finally study the parameter choices and the effect of hyperparameters. (P1)
What is the minimum data required to achieve good accuracies? (P2) How large
should the training dataset be in order to attain high accuracy? (P3) What is
the appropriate sampling rate that yields the best trade-off between accuracy and
efficiency? (P4) How do the hyperparameters affect the model performance?
4.7.1 Evaluation Methodology
For the three baseline methods (including correlation, coherence, and DTW), we
use Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve to determine the optimal thresh-
old that leads to Equal Error Rate (EER), and use Area Under the Curve (AUC) to
evaluate their performance. As our correlated dataset and uncorrelated dataset have
the same size, we can derive Accuracy = 1 - EER.
To evaluate SVM, S-LSTM and S-CNN, we adopt the methodology of Leave-One-
Subject-Out (LOSO) cross validation, which is widely used to evaluate authentication
systems [25]. We run LOSO where each time one subject is used for testing only (that
is, unseen users) and the other participants for training. We iterate the process to
test our models over all participants and report the average AUC and EER, which
can demonstrate how it works for unseen users (so it can answer Q3).
Model training. To train the SVM models, we try two different kernels: Gaus-
sian radial basis function (RBF) and linear kernel. We vary the penalty parameter C
from 0.001 to 1000, and the kernel parameter gamma in RBF from 0.0001 to 10. The
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Table 4.3 Hyper-parameters of S-LSTM and S-CNN, and
the ranges of their values explored in our experiments.
Hyper-parameters S-LSTM S-CNN
Number of Layers 1 ∼ 5 1 ∼ 5
Hidden dimension
or number of units in FC 16 ∼ 512 128 ∼ 2048
Learning rate 10−4 ∼ 10−1 10−4 ∼ 10−1
Decay rate 10−5 ∼ 10−3 10−5 ∼ 10−3
Max number of epochs 200 200
Optimizer SGD, Adam SGD, Adam
Loss function MSE, CE MSE, CE
values with the best accuracy are selected. We perform tedious feature selection for
each object. We use fisher score [23] to find the most effective features from the total
43 features (Section 4.4.1). A higher fisher score indicates that the features have a
better ability to separate data from different classes. Based on the score ranking, we
add the feature that increases the accuracy until no feature improves the performance
any more. In the end, we obtain different feature sets for different objects to achieve
the best performance. As an example, Table 4.4 shows the top 5 selected features for
the two objects, Drawer I and Drawer II. The result shows that a feature, which is
important for one object, has little effect on the other even if the two objects seem
similar. This shows that much tedious effort is required to select the best features
for each object when applying SVM. We normalize the feature distances, and use the
library Scikit-learn [96] to build an SVM that implements the Sequential Minimal
Optimization algorithm [26].
To train the best models for S-LSTM and S-CNN, we investigate the hyperparam-
eters showed in Table 4.3. We initialize the network weights for S-CNN and S-LSTM
using He’s initialization approach [43] and small random Guassian entries, respec-
tively. We choose the batch size of 128 for S-CNN, and 64 for S-LSTM. A smaller
batch size for LSTM can help reduce the length variance of inputs. After each epoch,
we measure the AUC and loss on the validation dataset, and save the model that
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Table 4.4 Top 5 selected features with the highest fisher score.
(F2: average value in z axis; F3: sd in x axis; F4: sd in y axis;
F6: average absolute difference in x axis; F7: average absolute
difference in y axis; F8: average absolute difference in z axis;
F9: average resultant value; F43: DTW distance)
Drawer I Drawer II
Features Fisher score Features Fisher score
F9 0.107 F9 0.207
F6 0.084 F43 0.203
F3 0.083 F2 0.146
F43 0.081 F7 0.144
F8 0.073 F4 0.119
achieves the best AUC as the best model. Early stopping is applied once the AUC
has no improvement in 10 consecutive epochs.
4.7.2 Performance Comparison between Design Choices
Answer to C1. We train a separate model for each object using the acceleration
data. The AUC and EER of each model for each method are showed in the rows 2-
7 in Table 4.5. We have the following observations. (1) Coherence performs the
worst on average. (2) Correlation is slightly better, but the accuracies are low
on some objects, such as oven and doors. (3) The performance of DTW is not
stable—it has good accuracies on some objects, but not on others, such as oven,
dumbbell, and gun. (4) SVM attains the average AUC=0.872, but its performance
is still not stable across the ten objects. (5) S-LSTM achieves better performance
than SVM on average. (6) S-CNN outperforms all the other methods with the
average AUC=0.932. Its performance keeps stable across all the objects. This can
be attributed to the Imagified Curve Comparison technique and the S-CNN design,
which captures more useful information for correlation evaluation.
Answer to C2. Training and deploying a separate model for each type of objects
can be a huge burden given the many different types of dumb objects. Thus, a single
comprehensive model that keeps accurate across multiple objects is highly desirable.
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Table 4.5 Performance comparison. O1: Door I; O2: Door II; O3: Fridge; O4: Oven;
O5: Cabinet; O6: Drawer I; O7: Drawer II; O8: Gun; O9: Remote; O10: Dumbbell.
Model Metric O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 Avg.
Correlation EERAUC
0.38
0.68
0.33
0.73
0.25
0.83
0.48
0.53
0.24
0.83
0.37
0.67
0.22
0.85
0.48
0.55
0.23
0.85
0.29
0.78
0.327
0.730
Coherence EERAUC
0.45
0.56
0.39
0.64
0.24
0.84
0.53
0.46
0.35
0.69
0.43
0.60
0.28
0.78
0.47
0.53
0.22
0.85
0.34
0.73
0.370
0.668
DTW EERAUC
0.15
0.91
0.31
0.74
0.23
0.86
0.31
0.74
0.15
0.92
0.24
0.84
0.19
0.90
0.35
0.69
0.27
0.78
0.48
0.62
0.268
0.800
SVM EERAUC
0.15
0.92
0.26
0.82
0.13
0.94
0.29
0.76
0.14
0.94
0.24
0.85
0.14
0.93
0.25
0.83
0.13
0.94
0.27
0.79
0.200
0.872
S-LSTM EERAUC
0.11
0.95
0.17
0.91
0.15
0.93
0.17
0.91
0.23
0.87
0.24
0.85
0.11
0.96
0.21
0.89
0.16
0.90
0.19
0.87
0.174
0.904
S-CNN EERAUC
0.16
0.90
0.15
0.93
0.12
0.95
0.17
0.91
0.10
0.97
0.18
0.90
0.11
0.96
0.15
0.93
0.12
0.95
0.15
0.92
0.141
0.932
SVM
(single model)
EER
AUC
0.24
0.84
0.27
0.80
0.20
0.87
0.39
0.64
0.19
0.89
0.30
0.76
0.22
0.85
0.33
0.72
0.16
0.90
0.31
0.76
0.261
0.803
S-LSTM
(single model)
EER
AUC
0.12
0.94
0.17
0.91
0.20
0.89
0.17
0.91
0.29
0.81
0.21
0.86
0.12
0.94
0.24
0.84
0.20
0.88
0.25
0.83
0.197
0.881
S-CNN
(single model)
EER
AUC
0.14
0.93
0.20
0.89
0.15
0.92
0.18
0.90
0.13
0.95
0.18
0.90
0.12
0.94
0.16
0.93
0.14
0.94
0.15
0.93
0.155
0.923
S-CNN
(Comb I)
EER
AUC
0.12
0.94
0.09
0.97
0.10
0.96
0.14
0.94
0.11
0.95
0.14
0.93
0.10
0.96
0.18
0.91
0.12
0.94
0.13
0.94
0.123
0.944
S-CNN
(Comb II)
EER
AUC
0.11
0.96
0.13
0.95
0.08
0.97
0.07
0.98
0.06
0.98
0.12
0.95
0.09
0.97
0.08
0.98
0.09
0.97
0.03
0.99
0.086
0.970
This experiment compares the performance of SVM, S-LSTM and S-CNN by training
such a single comprehensive model for each method. This time, we perform feature
selection for SVM by considering all the objects.
The AUC and EER of the single model for each method are shown in Table 4.5.
We can observe that S-CNN and S-LSTM outperform SVM significantly. One possible
reason is that SVM heavily depends on hand-crafted features, and it is challenging
to find a unified feature set that keeps good performance across multiple objects.
S-CNN degrades a little from the average AUC= 0.932 to AUC = 0.923, which is
much better than S-LSTM (AUC = 0.881). Note that the final accuracy of S-CNN
is AUC = 0.970, as detailed in Section 4.7.3.
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In short, S-CNN outperforms the other designs in terms of both accuracy and
generalization. Thus, in the following, we use the strategy of training a single S-CNN
model for all the 10 objects unless otherwise specified.
4.7.3 Sensor Data Combination
Answer to Q1. This experiment uses both the acceleration and gyroscope
data. We explore two ways to combine them: (Comb I) the two curves are plotted
overlapped using the same x axis; (Comb II) the two curves are plotted in one image
but placed at the top half and bottom half, separately (as shown in Figure 4.5).
We train and test S-CNN models in the two ways. The results in the last two
rows of Table 4.5 show that AUCs are improved for all the objects by combining the
data, and Comb II (AUC = 0.970) outperforms Comb I (AUC = 0.944) slightly.
A possible reason is that when two curves are plotted separately, the model learns
better how to weigh different regions of an image.
4.7.4 Adaptability
Answer to Q2. After two months, we asked each volunteer again to perform
operations on each object for 10+ times, and create a new testing dataset. Without
retraining, we directly measure the accuracy using the new testing dataset, and the
accuracy has no observable changes.
Answer to Q3. This is already examined by the LOSO (Leave-One-Subject-
Out) cross validation inherently (see Section 4.7.1), which always uses one participant
not seen during training for testing.
4.7.5 Efficiency
Answer to Q4. We then evaluate the response time, which is defined as the time
interval beginning at the time when a user starts an operation and ending at the time
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Table 4.6 Four parts of response time.
Name Value
Activity duration around 2 s
Transferring 2s data smartwatch: 159.7±26.3 mssensor node: 96.9±5.1 ms
Preprocessing 2s data 113.8±8.0 ms
Time for running Intel i7-6700: 19.2±4.1 ms; or
model on an image pair GeForce GTX 1080: 8.8±0.8 ms
when MoMatch makes a decision. It mainly consists of four parts: (a) the duration
of an activity; (b) the time used to transmit sensor data to the server; (c) the data
pre-processing time; and (d) the time that the neural network model computes the
correlation score of an image pair. Table 4.6 shows the measured time for each part.
The total response time is less than 2.5s. Thus, MoMatch makes a decision quickly.
Another important question is what computation resources are required for run-
ning our model. As shown in Table 4.6, when CPU (Intel i7-6700) is used, it takes
around 19.2ms given an image pair. Although GPU (GeForce GTX 1080) can reduce
the time to 8.8ms, such a small difference can hardly be noticed by users; hence, GPU
is not necessary for running the model.
Answer to Q5. As training is usually one-time effort, we use GPU to train
the model. Our S-CNN model can achieve the best performance after 5-10 epochs.
Each epoch contains 250 batches, and training each batch of images takes around
1.06± 0.4s on GPU. Thus, the training time is 46 mins (= 1.1× 250× 10) at most.
In contrast, S-LSTM requires at least 80 epochs to achieve reasonable perfor-
mance, each taking around 130s. So it totally requires about 180 mins for training.
Answer to Q6. We measure the energy consumption of our application on the
smartwatch. We let the smartwatch read 2s sensor data with a sampling rate of 50Hz
and send it to the server once every minute for one hour to simulate the object use
frequency of an average user.
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For comparison, we first measure the energy consumption when the screen is
always on, which is 37.3mA per hour. The consumption increases to 47.4mA per hour
when running our application while keeping the screen on. Thus, our application only
consumes about 10.1mA per hour (<2% of the battery capacity).
4.7.6 Security Analysis and Evaluation
We first analyze the resilience of MoMatch to the mimicry attacks described in the
Threat model (see Section 4.2.2), and then present our empirical study results.
Security Analysis. A mimicry attacker A who wants to succeed has to make
sure (1) his hand movement is similar to that of the victim V and (2) the movement
should be synchronous with that of V. However, studies have demonstrated that the
average human reaction time is larger than 200ms [35, 56, 83]; such a time difference
can be detected by our model, which captures the realtimeness of motion data. In
addition, assuming an attacker predicts (rather than observing and mimicking) the
action of V to launch an attack, although A may be able to align his attack-start
time better with V, it is difficult to ensure his hand movement is similar with that of
V and meanwhile keeps synchronous throughout the object use.
Empirical Study (and Answer to Q7). We have 10 participants act as
victims and another 10 as attackers. We tell attackers the internals of MoMatch
that it works based on motion correlation. We use two object types—the door and
the gun—as the representative of fixed-motion objects and that of free-motion ones,
respectively.
Our experiment contains two attack settings, as discussed in our Threat Model
in Section 4.2.2. Attack-I : V keeps walking, while A watches and mimics V’s hand
motions to operate on an object. Attack-II : V operates on an object, and meanwhile
A mimics V on another object of the same type. Each attacker performs attacks for
30 times on each object. For both Attack I and Attack II, we provide A with an ideal
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Figure 4.8: Attacker detection rate.
attack environment: (1) A has a clear view of V; (2) A has enough time to observe
V’s operations; and (3) V notifies A when starting an operation.
Given Attack-I attacks, MoMatch can identify 99% of attacks based on one sin-
gle operation of door II and 93% the gun. Given Attack-II attacks, MoMatch can
detect 84% and 86% of attacks based on one single operation of door II and the
gun, respectively. When an attacker uses multiple dumb objects to achieve his attack
purpose, it is straightforward to authenticate multiple operations to detect attackers
more accurately by launching MoMatch for multiple times. This strategy is adopted
by Zebra [77] as well. Figure 4.8 shows the detection rate by considering multiple
operations of objects, and the attacker detection rate reaches 96% after only 3 oper-
ations and near 100% after 4. In contrast, Zebra needs 84 interactions to recognize
all attackers (with a grace period of 2).
4.7.7 Parameter and Hyperparameter Study
Answer to P1. For a free-motion object, since a user may hold it for a while, we
need to determine the time length for authentication. As most activities in our dataset
last less than 4 seconds, we test the performance of our model on the first 1, 1.5, 2,
108
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Time (s)
0.80
0.90
0.95
1.00
A
U
C
Gun
Remote
Dumbbell
(a) AUC vs. duration of data.
2 4 6 8 10 12
Number of users
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
Door II
Fridge
Drawer II
Gun
Remote
Dumbbell
(b) AUC vs. number of users.
10 20 30 40 50 60 80 100 150 200
Sampling rate
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
Siamese-CNN
Siamese-LSTM
(c) AUC vs. sensor sampling rate.
1 2 3 4 5
Layer
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
Siamese-CNN
Siamese-LSTM
(d) AUC vs. number of network layers.
0 50 100 150 200
Epoch
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
L
os
s
Siamese-CNN
Siamese-LSTM
(e) Loss vs. number of epochs.
0 50 100 150 200
Epoch
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
Siamese-CNN
Siamese-LSTM
(f) AUC vs. number of epochs.
Figure 4.9: Impact of different hyperparameters and sensor sampling rate.
2.5 and 3 seconds sensor data, respectively. Figure 4.9a shows the AUC when using
both acceleration and gyroscope data. The largest improvement is observed when the
time is increased from 1 to 2 seconds, and there is no noticeable improvement when
it is increased from 2 to 3 seconds. Thus, 2 seconds sensor data is enough for our
model to obtain good performance for free-motion objects.
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Answer to P2. We next investigate how many users’ data is needed to train
our model. We randomly choose 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 users’ data for each object to
train the model, respectively, and use the rest data to test each trained model. This
experiment uses the objects of door II, fridge, drawer II, gun, remote and dumbbell
as examples. Figure 4.9b shows the performance. We can observe that S-CNN can
obtain a reasonable accuracy even if the training dataset uses 4 users, and a dataset
containing 8 users is large enough to train the S-CNN with satisfactory performance.
Answer to P3. To find the optimal sampling rate, we examine it ranging from
5Hz to 200Hz.
To study P3 and P4, we take dumbbell as an example. Other objects show similar
results and are omitted here. Figure 4.9c shows the impact of sampling rate on S-CNN
and S-LSTM. It can be observed that S-CNN performs well at 50Hz, and does not
improve significantly when the rate increases. We thus set the sampling rate as 50Hz.
For S-LSTM, its performance improves gradually as the rate is increased from 10Hz
to 30Hz; but the performance has no improvement and becomes unstable when the
rate is continuously increased. One possible reason is that the long input sequences
make the training of LSTM difficult [103]. By converting the data to images, this
fluctuation issue is mitigated in S-CNN, showing another advantage of S-CNN.
Answer to P4. We next evaluate the impact of hyperparameters on S-CNN
and S-LSTM (Table 4.3). We vary (1) the number of convolutional layers in S-CNN
and the number of hidden layers in S-LSTM. Figure 4.9d shows AUC reaches a high
value when the number is increased to 3 for S-CNN and 2 for S-LSTM; no noticeable
improvement arises when the number increaes. We thus choose 3 for S-CNN and 2
for S-LSTM.
To examine the impact of (2) the number of training epochs, we train the two
models for 200 epochs and record the loss and AUC after each epoch. The results
are showed in Figure 4.9e and Figure 4.9f. For S-CNN, the loss drops quickly and
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AUC reaches to the highest value after only 6 epochs. However, S-LSTM needs to
be trained more than 100 epochs to achieve the best performance. Thus S-CNN
converges much faster than S-LSTM.
We next investigate (3) the learning rate, (4) the decay rate, (5) the hidden
dimension in S-LSTM and the number of units in the fully-connected layer in S-
CNN, (6) two different optimizers, and (7) two different loss functions. We vary the
learning rate from 0.0001 to 0.1 at logarithmic intervals, and find that a rate of 0.001
for both S-CNN and S-LSTM yields the best performance. The learning decay rate
has a slight influence on S-CNN. The hidden dimension of 64 is the best for S-LSTM.
The unit number between 1200 and 1400 in the fully-connected layer in S-CNN can
obtain good performance, and we choose 1280. We also find Adam optimizer learns
faster and works better than SGD for both S-CNN and S-LSTM. For the loss function,
Cross-Entropy (CE) performs better than Mean Squared Error (MSE) for S-CNN,
which is opposite for S-LSTM.
4.7.8 Comparison with Other Approaches
Our work achieves much higher accuracies than SenseTribute [40] and Hallmarks [100],
which are based on behavioural biometrics. The accuracy of SenseTribute averages
74% with only 5 participants, and Hallmarks 63.8%. They both only consider fixed-
motion objects, and do not demonstrate whether their approaches can work on free-
motion objects. Moreover, neither examines its resilience to mimicry attacks.
Summary. The evaluation shows that MoMatch (1) attains high accuracies, (2)
generalizes well across a variety of objects, (3) keeps high accuracies even with users
that return after two months, (4) keeps high accuracies on unseen users, (5) has
low battery consumption, (6) makes quick decisions, and (7) is resilient to mimicry
attacks. Therefore, our approach is fast, accurate, efficient, usable and generalizable.
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4.8 Related Work
Limited research has been done on implicit authentication for dumb objects that
lack traditional user interfaces. SenseTribute [40] utilizes on-object sensor nodes
to identify occupants in smart homes. It collects motion data from the nodes and
exploits behavioral biometrics to recognize the user identity. However, as detailed
in Section 4.1, it omits the realtimeness information, so an attacker could launch
attacks anytime. Plus, it ignores the unique information of each object use, so any
unusual uses cannot be correctly classified. Due to the significant information loss, its
accuracy based on a single object use is only 74% (while the AUC of MoMatch is 0.97).
In addition, it has to deal with the habit-change issue through re-profiling, while
MoMatch does not use biometrics and, hence, does not need user profiling.
Once trained, MoMatch can be used to authenticate users, including those who are not
seen during training. It is worth pointing out that SenseTribute does not examine
mimicry attacks, which are studied carefully in our work.
Hodges and Pollack [49] designed a RFID reader based glove to collect users’ in-
teractions with objects instrumented with RFID tags. It investigates the patterns of
each user interacting with objects, which can be used for human identification. The
user identification accuracy based on a single object use is low. An attacker who
does not wear the glove to use an object will not trigger alarms, so it cannot be used
as a continuous monitoring approach for dumb objects. Like SenseTribute [40], a
large body of work exploits behavioral biometrics to propose implicit authentication
approaches, but most of them work for digital devices only, such as keystroke dynam-
ics [87] and mouse movements [146] on computers, touch behaviors [124, 67, 31, 68]
on smart phones.
Many proximity detection techniques can perform implicit authentication, such
as ZIA [18] and Apple’s Auto Unlock [4]. However, they can only confirm whether
a user is nearby, but not whether a user is actually using the object [77], causing
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unintentional authentications if a user is just standing near or passing by the object.
Moreover, when multiple users are near an object, it is unknown who is the one
using it. All the radio based proximity detection is vulnerable to the very mature
mafia fraud attacks, which relay radio signals to mislead the authentication system
to believe that a remote user’s token is nearby [132, 30, 41].
4.9 Summary
Environments like laboratories, hospitals, offices, and homes contain many dumb
objects that are security or privacy sensitive but lack input interfaces for applying tra-
ditional authentication approaches. How to authenticate users of such dumb objects
is an important research problem. We proposed the first implicit, fast and accurate
authentication approach for dumb objects. Its correctness is established on a solid
fact that the movement of an object and the owner hand should correlate. An imag-
ified curve comparison technique is proposed to convert the motion data correlation
measurement problem into an image comparison problem, which is resolved using
deep learning without the need of feature selection. The evaluation shows that a
single comprehensive model reaches AUC=0.97 across 10 various objects. In addition
to continuous authentication, we envision that MoMatch can enable many other ap-
plications, such as device personalization, patient rehabilitation, object-use logging,
and forensics.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In order to build a trustworthy smart environment, the security applications—
pairing and authentication—are in urgent need for densely deployed IoT devices and
many sensitive dumb objects. However, there still does not exist a secure and usable
pairing/authentication approach that can be applied to heterogeneous IoT devices.
As these devices usually lack conventional user interfaces, such as keyboards and dis-
plays, many traditional approaches relying on input secrets are not workable. Besides,
how to authenticate users of sensitive dumb objects is also an unresolved research
problem. Most dumb objects do not have any authentication interfaces, which makes
traditional authentication approaches inapplicable. This thesis is motivated by the
challenges arising from the constrained resources of IoT devices and dumb objects,
and presents secure and usable solutions based on the basic and common sensing
capability of smart devices.
First, we proposed a secure and usable pairing approach, which is applicable to
a large variety of IoT devices that lack sophisticated UIs and are heterogeneous in
nature. We designed simple paring operations that allow users wearing a wristband
or a smart ring (or holding their smartphone) to pair the IoT device in a secure and
fast way. We captured the motion trace and extracted salient events from the pairing
operations. Then, we leveraged the time intervals of the events to build up pairing
evidence. We designed a pairing protocol based on fuzzy commitment to identify
small distances between two pieces of evidence faithfully. Our approach does not
require any hardware modifications, sensor calibration, or clock synchronization, and
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thus can be applied to heterogeneous IoT devices. A comprehensive evaluation shows
that it has a low false rejection rate for legitimate pairings and a low false acceptance
rate under mimicry attacks. A user study confirms the high usability of our pairing
approach.
Second, we presented a secure and intuitive authentication method for IoT de-
vices that are highly diverse, cost-constrained, and lack of traditional UIs. Given
that almost all smart devices contain a clock, we built a universal sensing technique
based on the device clock to verify a user’s identity. We designed easy-to-perform au-
thentication gestures that allow users wearing a wristband to authenticate themselves
conveniently in less than 2.5 seconds. We extracted timestamps of critical events from
the user’s wristband and the IoT device, and converted them into features that are
fed into a machine learning model. A comprehensive evaluation along with a user
study confirms the high accuracy, security, usability, and stability of our approach.
Third, for dumb objects that lack input interfaces for applying traditional authen-
tication approaches, we proposed the first implicit, continuous and fast authentication
approach. It is built on a solid causal relationship: an object has a motion usually
because a human hand moves it. Thus, a legitimate use of the dumb object must
observe a high correlation between the object’s motion and the legitimate user’s hand
movement. Then, we proposed an imagified curve comparison technique that con-
verts the motion data correlation measurement problem into an image comparison
problem, and applied recent advances in neural networks to resolve the problem. Our
approach is implicit and user-friendly, as it authenticate users using only a single ob-
ject interaction when they interact with the environment. The evaluation shows that
a single trained model can achieve consistently high accuracy (AUC=0.97) across 10
various objects.
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5.1 Future Directions
In the future, I plan to continue to improve the current work. First, the usability
is not satisfactory when a user holding a smartphone twists a small knob for pair-
ing/authentication. I will investigate some other operations that are not only highly
usable but difficult for adversaries to mimic in real-time. A possible solution is to
have the user hold the smartphone in her left hand and put the left hand onto the
right one firmly, and then twist the knob. Second, apart from salient points/events
captured from physical operations, I will explore other possible information that can
be used for pairing and authentication. For example, voice has become an important
way users interact with many smart devices (e.g., Amazon Echo, Google Assistant).
I plan to explore the possibility of using perceived sound to validate the presence of
a legitimate user in smart environments.
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